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Notes and Comments
Specific Intent, Substituted Judgment and
Best Interests: A Nationwide Analysis of
an Individual's Right to Die
The tremendous advancements in medical technology in the
last several years have made it possible to sustain a person who
has minimal brain functioning .... It is now possible to hold such
persons on the threshold of death for an indeterminate period of
time by utilizing extraordinary mechanical or other artificial
means to sustain their vital bodily functions. The procedures used
can be accurately described as a means of prolonging the dying
process rather than a means of continuing life.'
Medical technology has effectively created a twilight zone of
suspended animation where death commences while life, in some
form, continues. Some patients, however, want no part of a life
sustained only by medical technology. Instead, they prefer a plan
of medical treatment that allows nature to take its course and
permits them to die with dignity.2
As scientific advances make it possible for us to live longer
than ever before, even when most of our physical and mental ca-
pacities have been irrevocably lost, patients and their families are
increasingly asserting a right to die a natural death without un-
due dependence on medical technology or unnecessarily pro-
tracted agony - in short, a right to "die with dignity."'
1. John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984).
2. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (1987).
3. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985).
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I. Introduction
These quotations underscore the sensitive and emotionally
charged controversy as to whether, and under what circum-
stances, both competent and incompetent patients have the
right to die, or as it is often termed, the right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment.
4
Wondrous advancements in biotechnology have blurred the
once bright line delineating the realms of life and death' by per-
mitting the maintenance of life beyond the point where the ter-
minally ill or patients in a persistent vegetative state' may want
to live. It has been said that
we are on the threshold of new terrain - the penumbra where
death begins but life, in some form continues. We have been led
to it by the medical miracles which now compel us to distinguish
between 'death,' as we have known it, and death in which the
body lives in some fashion but the brain (or a significant part of
4. An interdisciplinary group of lawyers, doctors, theologians, and others, was estab-
lished by Congress in 1978 to propose guidelines for implementing an individual's right
to refuse medical treatment. They stated the problem this way: "Once someone realizes
that the time and manner of death are substantially under the control of medical sci-
ence, he or she wants to be protected against decisions that make death too easy and
quick as well as from those that make it too agonizing and prolonged." PRESIDENT'S COM-
MISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAV-
ioRALz RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREnO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE
ETHICAL, MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 23 (1983) [hereinafter
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT]; see also Johnson, From Medicalization to Legaliza-
tion to Politicization: O'Connor, Cruzan, and Refusal of Treatment in the 1990s, 21
CONN. L. REv. 685 (1989); Peters, The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From
Quinlan to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891 (1989).
5. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 211, 741 P.2d at 678.
6. Dr. Fred Plum, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cor-
nell University, first used the term "persistent vegetative state." In re Jobes, 108 N.J.
394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987). Dr. Plum first described such a patient as a "subject
who remains with the capacity to maintain the vegetative parts of neurological function
but who.., no longer has any cognitive function." In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355
A.2d 647, 654, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Dr. Plum's refined description, after writing several treatises and numerous articles
on the condition, was noted in In re Jobes:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its in-
ternal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary
ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles
and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evi-
dence of either self-awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned
manner.
108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438.
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it) does not.7
Indeed, the constant injection of complex variables into the
debate over the issue of care for the hopelessly or terminally ill
has forced physicians, scientists, philosophers, theologians and,
perhaps most importantly, legislators and judges, to reexamine
and redefine the meaning of death. The traditional definition, a
cessation of pulse and respiration,' no longer suffices.9
The legal discussion concerning whether an individual has a
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment has largely fo-
cused on the basic tension between a patient's autonomy and
the state's legitimate interest in the preservation of life.10 How-
ever, the issue raises a litany of questions and conflicts in such
diverse disciplines as medicine, law, and religion."1 The quest to
resolve this question has resulted in an interrelationship of these
three disciplines that has often resulted in conflict. 2
7. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1344 (Del. Sup. 1980); see
also Barber v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014, 195
Cal. Rptr. 484, 488 (1983); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 6
(1980) ("With the advance of medical technology the heart and lungs can be prevented
from stopping and can be sustained on life support systems for indefinite periods....
[So, the question becomes w]hen does death occur - when the heart ceases or brain
function ends?").
8. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1968); see also Evans v. Halterman, 31
Ohio App. 175, 165 N.E. 869 (1928).
9. In response to this problem, the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research recommended in 1981
the adoption of the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA). Under its definition,
an individual who has sustained either 1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and respir-
atory functions, or 2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including
the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death must be made in accordance with
accepted medical standards. 12 U.L.A. 338 (Supp. 1991).
10. The importance of the preservation of life is found in various documents that
are an integral part of the history of the United States. The Declaration of Independence
states as self-evident truths "that all men ... are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." In
addition, the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, although vary-
ing the theme of the Declaration, provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Lastly,
many state constitutions explicitly recognize "certain natural and unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life ...." N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1.
11. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 344, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220 (1985) (the New Jersey
Supreme Court acknowledged, "[n]o one person or profession has all the answers.").
12. See, e.g., In re Quinlan:
Medicine with its combination of advanced technology and professional ethics is
both able and inclined to prolong biological life. Law with its felt obligation to
3
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Until recently, medical decisions about prolonging life were
relatively straightforward because of the limited options open to
physicians and the few effective therapies from which to choose.
However, physicians now have greater control over the time and
nature of death due to advances in medical science, the fact that
medical care is increasingly being provided to dying patients in
institutional settings, and the increasing number of deaths
caused by chronic, degenerative disease rather then communica-
ble disease."s
Unfortunately, the development of new medical techniques
has complicated the traditional duty of physicians to make every
conceivable effort to prolong a patient's life." Potentially thera-
peutic interventions to postpone the death of terminally ill pa-
tients have, at times, been undertaken regardless of the effect on
the patient and contrary to the patient's best interests."5 These
medical techniques have resulted in a quality of life for the pa-
tient that "can range from marginally tolerable to positively
miserable.""6 Physicians have been slow to acknowledge that in
many cases the effect of certain therapies may not advance the
patients' goals and values. Indeed, in many cases this delay re-
sults in "prolong[ing] suffering, [and] isolat[ing] the family from
their loved one at a time when they may be close at hand or
protect the life and freedom of the individual seeks to assure each person's right
to live out his human life until its natural and inevitable conclusion. Theology
with its acknowledgment of man's dissatisfaction with biological life as the ulti-
mate source of joy ... defends the sacredness of human life and defends it from
all direct attacks. . . . Each must in some way acknowledge the other without
denying its own competence.
70 N.J. 10, 32, 355 A.2d 647, 659 (quoting the position statement of Bishop Lawrence B.
Casey reproduced in his amicus curiae brief for the case), cert. denied sub nor. Garger
v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
13. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
737, 370 N.E.2d 417, 423 (1977); see also PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4,
at 16-17.
14. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (such as the use of respirators to
aid in breathing, gastronomic tubes to artificially provide nutrition and hydration, and
chemotherapy to limit the effects of cancer).
15. Id.
16. Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 196, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 846
(1988) (quoting Ruark, Raffin & Stanford University Medical Center Committee on Eth-
ics, Special Article: Initiating and Withdrawing Life Support, 318 Naw ENG. J. MED. 25,
25 (1988)).
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result[ing] in economic ruin for the family.' 1 7 Thus, a direct
conflict has arisen between the fundamental medical objectives
of sustaining life and relieving suffering.' 8
Traditionally, the law has lagged behind the most advanced
thinking in theology and medicine and has waited for theolo-
gians, physicians, and other moral leaders to create some com-
mon ground with regard to such a complex issue. 19 However, ad-
vances in medical science have given doctors a "range of options
... to postpone death irrespective of the effect on the patient."20
Furthermore, societal changes in how and where people die, and
the inability of physicians and theologians to forge a common
ground due to the significant conceptual and ethical conflicts in-
volved, have heightened public concern and forced legislators
and judges to grapple with the sensitive issue of whether an in-
dividual has a right to die. Consequently, legislators and judges
have been compelled to formulate new standards and procedures
for measuring the conduct of persons involved in the care of ei-
ther terminally ill or comatose patients.
Despite the absence of effective legislative guidance in this
area, courts have attempted to deal with the issue. They have
approached this acutely moral and emotional issue "with ex-
treme caution and humility, mindful of the profound and over-
whelming sense of responsibility"'" that accompanies the life
and death issues in these cases.
17. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737-38, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (quoting Lewis, Machine
Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206 J. A.M.A. 387, 387 (1968)).
18. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 15. A similar conflict exists in
the area of theology; that is, the tension between the Judeo-Christian tradition of central
respect and reverence for the sanctity and preservation of human life, and religion's "re-
sponsibility to assist man in the formation and pursuit of a correct conscience as to the
acceptance of natural death when [medical] science has confirmed its inevitability be-
yond any hope other than that of preserving biological life in a merely vegetative state."
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 32-33, 355 A.2d 647, 658-59 (quoting the position statement of
Bishop Lawrence B. Casey reproduced in his amicus curiae brief for the case), cert. de-
nied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). It should be noted that Bishop
Casey resolved the theological dilemma for the Catholic Church by stating that the deci-
sion of the patient's father to discontinue the treatment being provided was a morally
correct decision given the circumstances and the irreversible condition of the patient. Id.;
see also infra notes 234-41 and accompanying text.
19. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423 (citing Burger, The Law and
Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. SupP. 7, 15, 17 (1967)).
20. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 737, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
21. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 211-12, 741 P.2d 674, 678-79 (1987).
1991]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
The debate is extremely complex. It involves issues of con-
stitutional law, individual rights, competing state interests, and
other questions of biomedical and religious ethics. However, the
courts generally have been able to compress these issues into
several fundamental questions that take into account the com-
peting considerations and conceptual conflicts.
First, is there any legal predicate to allow a competent pa-
tient the right to refuse medical treatment even if such a refusal
will hasten death? 22 Second, if a right to refuse medical treat-
ment exists, does it survive incompetency if the patient left writ-
ten expressions of his wishes prior to becoming incompetent?23
Third, are there legitimate state interests that should be bal-
anced against the right of an individual to refuse medical treat-
ment?24 Fourth, what role should the judicial branch play in
resolving disputes relating to the personal expression of an indi-
vidual's right to die, and to what degree should judicial involve-
ment be required in such cases?25 Finally, the core question of
the debate: given a protected right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment and an appropriate surrogate decisionmaker to express,
and therefore preserve, this right on behalf of an incompetent
patient, what standards, requirements, and limitations should
govern such a decision?2 6 The state courts have wrestled with
these issues during the last fifteen years.27 However, results have
been extremely diverse and inconsistent, reflecting the contro-
versy and uncertainty which permeates this intense and personal
issue.
This Comment has three basic objectives. After providing a
background and foundation in section II, section III analyzes
leading state court decisions involving a patient's right to refuse
medical treatment. The major differences among states which
have considered this issue are highlighted. Special emphasis is
placed on the standards, requirements, and limitations which
should govern a patient's right to refuse medical treatment.
22. See infra notes 31-57 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 112-350 and accompanying text.
27. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 412 n.4 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (listing
fifty-four reported decisions between 1976 and 1988), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
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Section IV briefly reviews the case of Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health,28 the first United States Su-
preme Court ruling on the validity of an individual's right to
refuse medical treatment when that refusal will inevitably lead
to death. This section also explores the effect, if any, this deci-
sion will have on other states.
Finally, section V discusses the current statutory law gov-
erning an individual's right to refuse medical treatment and dis-
cusses the potential impact this "legislative guidance" will have
on the courts and affected individuals.30
This Comment attempts to inform the reader why the issue
of whether an individual has a protected right to refuse medical
treatment is so complex. Given the diverse approaches by indi-
vidual state courts and the lack of effective legislative guidance
in this area, it is, and will remain, one of the most controversial
constitutional issues in the United States. The proper place to
begin the analysis is with the constitutional, philosophical, and
conceptual framework underlying and supporting the right to re-
fuse medical treatment.
II. Theoretical Background
A. Constitutional Right of Privacy
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly
mention a right of privacy, it is said to arise from penumbras of
specific guarantees in the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth and
fourteenth amendments.31 Although the boundaries of an indi-
vidual right of privacy32 have not been clearly defined by the
United States Supreme Court, it appears well settled that "per-
sonal rights found in this guarantee of personal privacy must be
limited to those which are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the con-
28. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
29. See infra notes 351-88 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 389-435 and accompanying text.
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see also Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[Tlhe [Supreme] Court has recognized that a right of personal
privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the
Constitution.").
32. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("the right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right most val-
ued by civilized men.").
1991]
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cept of ordered liberty' "3 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition.""
As a result, the Court has recognized several areas of an in-
dividual's private life that may be successfully protected from
governmental intrusion absent a compelling state interest. These
include child rearing and education,3 5 abortion,3 6 the use of con-
traception, 7 possession of obscene material in one's home,38
marriage,' familial relationships, 40  and procreation. 41  Con-
versely, other matters have been found to be subject to govern-
mental intrusion.42
Prior to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of
Health, the United States Supreme Court had not ruled on
whether the right of privacy encompassed the right of an indi-
vidual to refuse medical treatment.4 However, several state
courts, taking into consideration the Court's expansive view of
substantive due process, have held that the constitutional right
of privacy is broad enough to include the fundamental right of a
competent patient "to chart his or her own medical treatment
plan" and "to be free from unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity, including medical treatment, in appropriate circum-
stances."4 4 In addition to holding that a competent patient's
33. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325-26 (1937).
34. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
35. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
36. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (the right of privacy is a personal and
individual right "broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to ter-
minate her pregnancy"). But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S. Ct.
3040 (1989) (limits on a woman's right to obtain an abortion were upheld by the Court).
37. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); see also Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
38. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
39. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
40. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
41. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
42. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (right of privacy does not
encompass the right to engage in homosexual sodomy even in one's own home); State v.
Murphy, 117 Ariz. 57, 570 P.2d 1070 (1977) (federal constitutional right of privacy does
not encompass the right to possess or ingest marijuana in one's own home).
43. But see Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring). "[Tihe
freedom to care for one's health and person" is constitutionally protected. Id. (emphasis
in original).
44. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 214-15, 741 P.2d 674, 681-82 (1987); see
also Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/7
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right to refuse medical treatment falls within the constitution-
ally protected zone of privacy, 5 several state courts have also
held that the right to refuse medical treatment is protected by
their respective state constitutions. 6
In sum, according to most state courts considering refusal of
treatment cases prior to Cruzan, the United States Constitution,
via a shadowy penumbra, and in some instances, state constitu-
tions, provide for an individual right of privacy that encom-
passes and supports a competent patient's right to refuse medi-
cal treatment even if such a refusal will hasten the death of the
patient.47
297, 301 (1986); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132, 482
A.2d 713, 717 (1984); In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158 (Del. Ch. 1980); Corbett v.
D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Superintendent of
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424 (1977);
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d 408, 418 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222-23 (1985); Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio
Misc. 1, 9, 426 N.E.2d 809, 813-14 (1980); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119-20, 660
P.2d 738, 741-42 (1983).
45.
An individual successfully can assert his or her constitutional right to privacy only
against governmental acts and not against acts of a private defendant unless 'state
action' exists. 'State action' is present when 'there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.' We believe
that the state's authority to license and regulate hospital, medical, dental and op-
tometric service corporations, health care institutions, and physicians, surgeons
and nurses, and its supervisory authority over the guardianship of incapacitated
persons are factors that taken together are sufficient to establish state action [in
the area of refusal of medical treatment ....
Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 215 n.9, 741 P.2d at 682 n.9 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 215, 741 P.2d at 682 (pursuant to article 2, section 8 of the Arizona Con-
stitution which expressly states that "[n]o person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law."); see also Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d at
1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 301 (pursuant to article 1, section 1 of the California Constitu-
tion); Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (pursuant
to article 1, section 23 of the Florida Constitution); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (pursuant to article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution), cert.
denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 120,
660 P.2d at 742 (pursuant to article 1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution).
47. See In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987) (competent 37-year-old
mother with a terminal illness had the right to the removal of her respirator although
such a removal would hasten death); Bouvia, 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297
(competent 28-year-old quadriplegic, though not terminally ill, had the right to have re-
moved a nasogastric feeding tube which was inserted against her will. In fact, the court
commented that the right of a competent patient to refuse medical treatment is so basic
1991]
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B. Common Law Doctrine of Informed Consent
The right of self-determination and individual autonomy is
deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition.4" John Stuart
Mill set forth his view of individual autonomy and personal lib-
erty in this way:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised
over any member of a civilized community against his will, is to
prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is
not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do
or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it
will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so
would be wise, or even right. ... The only part of the conduct of
any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which con-
cerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his inde-
pendence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body
and mind, the individual is sovereign.
4 9
The United States Supreme Court recognized an individ-
ual's right to be free from bodily invasion a century ago when it
noted that, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unques-
tionable authority of law." 50 Judge Cardozo, prior to ascending
to the Supreme Court, expressed this spirit of individual auton-
omy and freedom in the context of medical treatment when he
stated that, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his pa-
tient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
and fundamental that "[i]ts exercise requires no one's approval. It is not merely one vote
subject to being overridden by medical opinion."); Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal.
App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (competent 70-year-old man, seriously ill, though
not terminal, had the right to have his respirator and other life-support equipment re-
moved, despite the fact that withdrawal of such devices would hasten his death); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980)
(competent 73-year-old man suffering from Lou Gehrig's disease had the right to seek
removal of the respirator from his trachea).
48. See, e.g., Mill, On Liberty, reprinted in THaxa EssAys 5 (1975).
49. Id. at 15.
50. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
[Vol. 11:565
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damages."51
Protection of this common law right to be free from non-
consensual bodily invasions is at the core of what has become
known as the doctrine of informed consent. This doctrine "arose
in recognition of the value society places on a person's autonomy
and as the primary vehicle by which a person can protect the
integrity of his body."52 Under this doctrine,
the patient must have the capacity to reason and make judg-
ments, the decision must be made voluntarily and without coer-
cion, and the patient must have a clear understanding of the risks
and benefits of the proposed treatment alternatives or nontreat-
ment, along with a full understanding of the nature of the disease
and the prognosis.5"
Although emergency situations require different rules, "[i]n gen-
eral, the more intense and personal the consequences of a choice
and the less direct or significant the impact of that choice upon
others, the more compelling the claim to autonomy in the mak-
ing of a given decision."54
In view of the individual's right to be free from unwanted
bodily invasions and the requirement that physicians inform pa-
tients of all material facts and risks relating to their condition,
the informed consent doctrine would be rendered useless if, "af-
ter receiving all information necessary to make an informed de-
cision, the patient is forced to choose only from alternative
methods of treatment and precluded from foregoing all treat-
ment whatsoever."55 Many state courts have expanded the con-
cept to include the right of a competent patient to withhold con-
sent and refuse treatment even if such treatment involves life-
sustaining procedures.5 Freedom of choice, which underlies the
51. Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914); see also Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 513, 502 P.2d 1, 9
(1972).
52. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
53. Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safar, Stone, Taussig &
Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 955, 957 (1984).
54. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest,
95 YALE L.J. 219, 220 (1985).
55. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987).
56. State courts which have held that a competent patient's right to refuse medical
treatment is both a constitutional right and a common law right (pursuant to the doc-
1991]
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common law right to be free from non-consensual physical inva-
sions, "must include the possibility of alternative treatment or
no treatment at all" and, therefore, according to many states,
"encompasses the right [of competent patients] to refuse life
sustaining treatment in certain circumstances. '5 7
C. Incompetency and the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining
Treatment
Beyond examining whether a particular state recognizes a
competent patient's right to refuse life sustaining treatment pur-
suant to a constitutional right of privacy, the common law doc-
trine of informed consent, or both, it must be determined
whether such a right survives the incompetency of the patient,
even in circumstances where the patient left no clear indication
of his intent prior to becoming incompetent.
Typically, only an individual can assert his common law or
trine of informed consent) include Arizona (Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at
683), California (Bouvia v. Superior Court (Glenchur), 179 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1134, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297, 300 (1986) ("It follows that such a [competent] patient has the right to
refuse any medical treatment, even that which may save or prolong her life." (emphasis
in original))), Connecticut (Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127,
132, 482 A.2d 713, 718 (1984)), Massachusetts (Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398
Mass. 417, 431, 497 N.E.2d, 626, 633 (1986)), Minnesota (Conservatorship of Torres, 357
N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984) (although the court recognized the common law right,
it premised its holding on the constitutional and statutory right)), Missouri (Cruzan v.
Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 417 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)), New
Jersey (In re Farrell, 108 N.J. 335, 348, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (1987)), and Washington (In re
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 121-22, 660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983)).
State courts which have expressly limited a competent patient's right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment to the common law doctrine of informed consent (and have not
recognized such a right pursuant to a constitutional right of privacy) include Illinois (Es-
tate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (1989)), Maine (In re Gardner,
534 A.2d 947, 951 (Me. 1987)), and New York (In re Storar and In re Eichner v. Dillon,
52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 272-273, cert. denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981)).
Some state legislatures, when enacting legislation in this area, have also recognized
the right to control one's own medical treatment and declared it to be fundamental. See,
e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West 1990) (the findings and declarations
underlying California's Natural Death Act mandate an individual's fundamental right to
have life-sustaining procedures withheld or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condi-
tion); WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.050 (Supp. 1990).
57. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743; see also Gardner, 534 A.2d at 951
("An individual's right to control his medical care is not lessened when the treatment at
issue involves life sustaining medical procedures.").
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constitutional rights.58 Because of the fundamental nature of the
individual's right to be free of non-consensual invasion of one's
bodily integrity," however, state courts have logically concluded
that "to deny the exercise [of the right] because the patient is
unconscious would be to deny the right."60
The New York Supreme Court expressed the justification
for such a conclusion this way:
We . . . conclude that by standards of logic, morality and
medicine the terminally ill should be treated equally, whether
competent or incompetent. Can it be doubted that the "value of
human dignity extends to both"? What possible societal policy
objective is vindicated or furthered by treating the two groups of
terminally ill differently? What is gained by granting such a fun-
damental right only to those who, though terminally ill, have not
suffered brain damage and coma in the last stages of the dying
process? The very notion raises the spectra of constitutional infir-
mity when measured against the Supreme Court's recognition
that incompetents must be afforded all their due process rights;
indeed any State scheme which irrationally denies to the termi-
nally ill competent patient is plainly subject to constitutional
attack. 1
In sum, state courts considering the issue have concluded
that an individual's protected right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, whether based on the United States Consti-
tution, a state constitution, or common law, survives the incom-
petency of the individual despite any failure to express his
wishes regarding medical treatment prior to becoming
incompetent.2
58. See, e.g., Bell v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 174 Conn. 493, 391 A.2d 154
(1978).
59. See, e.g., In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 372, 529 A.2d 419, 423 (1987) ("All patients,
competent or incompetent, with some limited cognitive ability or in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, terminally ill or not terminally ill, are entitled to choose whether or not they
want life-sustaining medical treatment.").
60. Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980).
61. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219, 741 P.2d 674, 686 (1987) (quoting
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 464-65, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 542-43 (1980) (emphasis in
original, citations omitted), modified on other grounds sub nom. In re Storar 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981)).
62. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
745-46, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427-28 (1977):
[W]e recognize a general right in all persons to refuse medical treatment in appro-
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D. The Four Countervailing State Interests
As with any other individual right protected by either the
Constitution or common law, the right to refuse medical treat-
ment by either a competent or incompetent patient is not abso-
lute.6 s It is well settled that the state has an interest in four ar-
eas: 1) preserving life; 2) protecting the interests of innocent
third parties; 3) preventing suicide; and 4) maintaining the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession.6 4
The state's interest in preserving life is generally considered
the most significant of the four. 5 The importance of this inter-
est is justified since it "embrac[es] two separate but related con-
cerns: an interest in preserving the life of the particular patient,
priate circumstances. The recognition of that right must extend to the case of an
incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human dignity
extends to both.... To protect the incompetent person within its power, the State
must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person and afford to that person
the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in competent persons.
Id. at 745-46, 370 N.E.2d at 427-28; see also Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App.
3d 185, 207-08, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 854-55 (1988) (the court based its conclusion primar-
ily on the California Supreme Court case of Conservatorship of Valerie N., 40 Cal. 3d
143, 219 Cal. Rptr. 387, 707 P.2d 760 (1985), in which the court expressly held that a
severely retarded and incompetent individual, had the same fundamental rights as a
competent person in the area of procreative choice despite any statutory prohibitions to
the contrary); Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 133, 482 A.2d
713, 718 (1984); Severns, 421 A.2d at 1347; John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Blud-
worth, 452 So. 2d 921, 923 (Fla. 1984); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 359, 486 A.2d 1209,
1229 (1985); Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 ("If a putative decision by Karen to
permit this non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded
as a valuable incident of her right of privacy... then it should not be discarded solely on
the basis that her condition prevents her conscious exercise of the choice."); In re Colyer,
99 Wash. 2d 114, 123, 660 P.2d 738, 744 (1983).
63. Leach v. Akron Gen. Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 9 (1980). ("On one side of
the scale, this court must place a constitutionally protected right; on the other, any po-
tential interest, either societal or legal, that the state might wish to protect.").
64. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 216, 741 P.2d 674, 683 (1987);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 225 (1984);
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital, 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132-34, 482 A.2d 713, 718
(1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So.
2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728, 741, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348-49, 486 A.2d 1209,
1223 (1985); Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122, 660 P.2d 738,
743 (1983).
65. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 425; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349,
486 A.2d at 1223; PREsmNer's CoMMissioN REPORT, supra note 4, at 32.
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and an interest in preserving the sanctity of life." 66 The second
state interest involves the protection of innocent third parties,
specifically minor children, from emotional or financial damage
resulting from an individual's choice to refuse life sustaining
treatment.6 7 The third state interest, the prevention of suicide,
is self-explanatory.6 8 The fourth state interest, safeguarding the
integrity of the medical profession, involves both the review of
modern medical practices and professional attitudes towards re-
fusal of treatment scenarios and the ability of hospitals and phy-
sicians to effectively treat patients."
Despite the considerable magnitude and legitimacy of these
four state interests, state courts have not found them to be com-
pelling or substantial enough to outweigh the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.70 This statement, of course, begs
the question of how the state courts have universally justified
such a conclusion.71
Although the state interest in the preservation of life is
most significant, such an interest must be balanced against the
individual's interest in refusing to endure the tremendous cost of
prolonging life.7 2 State court decisions generally view the pa-
66. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223; see also Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216,
741 P.2d at 683.
67. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426; see also Conroy, 98 N.J. at 353,
486 A.2d at 1225 ("When the patient's exercise of his free choice could adversely and
directly affect the health, safety, or security of others....
68. See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
69. Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 10.
70. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216-18, 741 P.2d at 683-85; Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 132-34, 482 A.2d at 713, 718-20 (1984);
In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); Estate of Longeway, 133 IIl. 2d 33,
48, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 432-
40, 497 N.E.2d 626, 634-39 (1986); Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339
(Minn. 1984); Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-55, 486 A.2d at 1223-25; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9-
10.
71. Subordination of state interests has not been so universal when other circum-
stances surrounded an individual's choice to refuse medical treatment. This is true par-
ticularly in the area of blood transfusions. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Ge-
orgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.) (state interest in preventing the
abandonment of a child outweighed mother's religious objection to receiving a blood
transfusion) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Hes-
ton, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (patient's express refusal of a blood transfusion,
based on religious beliefs, was outweighed by the state's interest in preserving life).
72. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425; see also Foody, 40 Conn. Supp.
at 134, 482 A.2d at 718.
1991]
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
tient's prognosis73 as being determinative of the state interest,
while the nature of the treatment (i.e., usefulness, benefits, and
intrusiveness of the treatment) typically frames the patient's in-
terest.74 Consequently, the general rule balancing these interests,
first utilized by the Quinlan court, is that the state's interest in
the preservation of life "weakens and the individual's right of
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion [associated with
the treatment in question] increases and the prognosis dims. 75
In other words, the state's interest in preserving life is ex-
treme when "the affliction is curable,' '7  but the interest ebbs
and the balance shifts when the issue is not "whether, but when,
for how long, and at what cost to the individual that life may be
briefly extended. ' 77 As a result of this analysis, courts have ef-
fectively removed this significant state interest as an obstacle to
the expression of a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment, either personally or through a surrogate. This result seems
appropriate, since the circumstances typically reflect a termi-
nally ill or persistent vegetative patient with a prognosis of no
recovery and potential medical treatment that involves a high
degree of bodily invasion 78 that will prolong life at an extreme
and traumatic cost to the patient.79
73. See generally Note, The "Terminal Condition" Condition in Virginia's Natural
Death Act, 73 VA. L. Rxv. 749, 771 (1987) (contrasting Quinlan's "prognosis based ap-
proach" with the approach of particular state statutes that view the patient's life expec-
tancy as determinative of the state interest within this balance).
74. Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 134, 482 A.2d at 718-19.
75. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 cert. denied sub nom. Garger v.
New Jersey, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
76. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 425-26.
77. Id.; see also In re Spring, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 831, 399 N.E.2d 493 (1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980):
The general State interest in the preservation of life - most weighty where the
patient, properly treated, can return to reasonable health, without great suffering,
and a decision to avoid treatment would be aberrational - carries far less weight
where the patient is approaching the end of his normal life span, where his afflic-
tions are incapacitating, and where the best that medicine can offer is an exten-
sion of suffering.
Id. at 845-46, 399 N.E.2d at 502.
78. Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 135, 482 A.2d at 719 (examples include "around the
clock nursing care, drugs to control brain seizures, the assistance of a respirator, a lung
cleaning suction catheter and a nasogastric feeding tube.").
79. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 731-33, 370 N.E.2d at 420-22; Brophy, 398
Mass. at 421-27, 497 N.E.2d at 628-31; Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 135, 482 A.2d at 719;
Severns, 425 A.2d at 157; Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 3; Longeway, 133 IMI. 2d at 36, 549
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The second state interest considered is the protection of in-
nocent third persons, which in the context of refusal of treat-
ment cases typically involves children. 0 Courts have lessened
the weight of this interest with respect to the patient's right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, when his condition is
terminal or persistently vegetative, in three ways. First, and per-
haps easiest for the court, is the situation when the patient has
no children who might suffer materially or emotionally from the
patient's decision to withdraw life-sustaining equipment. In
these circumstances, the interest of third parties is minimal, at
best, and does not outweigh the patient's right.8 '
Second, is the situation when the spouse and children of a
patient, as well as a litany of friends and relatives, join in asking
the court for a discontinuation of the life-support systems given
the patient's irreversible condition and desire to exercise her
right to refuse such treatment. As in the first instance, the inter-
est of other third parties in such a situation is minimal or does
not exist and is outweighed by the patient's right. 82
Last, is the situation when a patient wishing to exercise his
right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment has children as
well as a spouse who do not expressly join in asking the court to
discontinue life-support systems. Nevertheless, the state's inter-
est in protecting innocent third parties still does not outweigh
the patient's interest. For example, in In re Farrell,8" where a
terminally ill, competent, thirty-seven-year-old wife and mother
of two teenage sons wished to remove her life support systems
and "die with dignity," the court distinguished this case from
one in which a parent could be forced to accept treatment, as for
example, in the area of blood transfusions, because recovery was
N.E.2d at 293; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 116, 660 P.2d at 740.
80. See, e.g., In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008
(D.C. Cir.) (blood transfusion ordered to save the life of a mother, despite her religious
beliefs to the contrary, given the state interest in preventing the abandonment of her
child, and the mother's "responsibility to the community to care for her infant") cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.
1972) (overruling a father's refusal to undergo a blood transfusion to save his life since
his refusal would devastate his dependents); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Hes-
ton, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (blood transfusion ordered for a pregnant woman).
81. See, e.g., Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 137-38, 482 A.2d at 720.
82. See, e.g., Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9-10.
83. 108 N.J. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); see also supra note 47.
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feasible and the security of the surviving children was
threatened. 4 The Farrell court instead found that Mrs. Farrell
had considered her children's interests when deciding to with-
draw her respirator, and that her husband's capacity to care for
the children in her absence was "unquestioned. 8 5 Therefore, the
court held that the state interest in the protection of innocent
third persons was not sufficient to override her right to decide. 6
The third state interest in the prevention of suicide has gen-
erally received little discussion by the courts. In short, a pa-
tient's decision to cease life-sustaining medical treatment does
not constitute suicide.8 This conclusion is true because:
(1) in refusing treatment the patient may not have the specific
intent to die, and (2) even if he did, to the extent that the cause
of death was from natural causes the patient did not set the
death-producing agent in motion with the intent of causing his
own death. 8
Patients who choose to forego life-sustaining treatment typically
do not have a specific intent to die, but fervently wish to live
only if they can do so without medical technology, surgery,
drugs, or prolonged suffering. 8 In essence, "[rlefusing medical
intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course;
if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primar-
ily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of self-inflicted
injury."90
A final state interest which is often offered as a potential
limitation on an individual's right to refuse medical treatment,
is that of safeguarding the integrity of the medical profession.
Although the view that medical ethics do not require medical
intervention at all costs has only recently gained wide support,
84. Farrell, 108 N.J. at 352, 529 A.2d at 413.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 51-52 & n.9, 355 A.2d at 670 & n.9.
88. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743 n.11, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11; see also Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743; Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Com-
petent Adult, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 17-18 (1975).
89. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 162-63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("The
testimony of Mr. Permutter ... is that he really wants to live, but [to] do so, God and
Mother Nature willing, under his own power.") aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
90. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 351, 486 A.2d at 1224.
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as long ago as 1624 Francis Bacon wrote, "I esteem it to the of-
fice of a physician not only to restore health, but to mitigate
pain and dolours; and not only when such mitigation may con-
duce to recovery, but when it may serve to make a fair and easy
passage." '91
This view is now the official position of the American Medi-
cal Association, which in 1986 stated:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and re-
lieve suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with
the other, the choice of the patient, or his family or legal repre-
sentative if the patient is incompetent to act in his own behalf,
should prevail.
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma [or terminal
illness] is beyond doubt irreversible and there are adequate safe-
guards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis and with the con-
currence of those who have responsibility for the care of the pa-
tient, it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life
prolonging medical treatment.9 2
In addition to demonstrating that refusal of treatment cases
involving comatose or terminally ill patients will not "bring into
disrepute the ethical integrity of the medical profession,"93 the
profession has abandoned the mostly symbolic and ethical dis-
tinction between life-sustaining or prolonging procedures that
provide oxygen (respirators) or waste disposal (dialysis machines
or catheters) and procedures that involve the artificial provision
of nutrition and hydration such as the insertion of nasogastric
tubes.94
91. F. Bacon, New Atlantis quoted in Mannes, Euthanasia vs. The Right to Life, 27
BAYLOR L. Rv. 68, 69 (1975).
92. American Medical Association Council on Ethics & Judicial Affairs, Withhold-
ing or Withdrawing Life-Prolonging Medical Treatment, Opinion 2.18 (March 15, 1986)
(emphasis added); see also Bartling, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 225;
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 743-44, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27 ("Recognition of the right to refuse
necessary treatment in appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical mo-
res; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of the medical profession, the
proper role of hospitals in caring for such patients or the State's interest in protecting
the same."); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 744.
93. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 218, 741 P.2d at 685.
94. See American Medical Association Opinion 2.18, supra note 92. "(A]rtificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration" is equivalent to other forms
of life-sustaining or prolonging medical treatment for the purposes of defining the right
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State courts have also agreed that although there is a cer-
tain amount of emotional symbolism attached to the provision
of nutrition and hydration, "there is no legal difference between
a mechanical device that allows a person to breathe artificially
and a mechanical device that artificially allows a person nourish-
ment." ' As a result, both the courts and the medical profession
have recognized that the provision of artificial nutrition and hy-
dration should be treated as any other medical treatment when
the patient is irreversibly ill. These institutions have further rec-
ognized that the termination of such procedures does not im-
pugn the integrity of the medical profession since termination
"does not deprive the patient of life; rather, the inability of the
patient to chew or swallow, as a result of his illness, is viewed as
the ultimate agent of death."""
In sum, state courts have found the state's interest in main-
taining the ethical integrity of the medical profession to be in-
sufficient to deny the patient's wishes in treatment situations
where he is either terminally ill or in a persistent vegetative
state. In light of the position of the medical profession, which
finds the expression of such a right completely consistent with
the current state of medical ethics, the patient's right to refuse
or withdraw any life-support system, whether it be a respirator
of the patient to reject or accept such bodily invasions. Id.
95. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 587 (D.R.I. 1988); see also Estate of
Longeway, 133 IMl. 2d 33, 41-42, 549 N.E.2d 292, 295-96; In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947,
954-55 (Me. 1987); Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986); PREsiDzNT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 190.
Similarly, the state courts have abandoned the traditional distinction between ordi-
nary and extraordinary medical treatment, which had been dispositive of whether to dis-
continue life-sustaining measures in refusal of treatment cases, since "while there is
medical recognition of the right of a sapient and sentient patient to refuse extraordinary
treatment, when a patient is in an apparently non-reversible vegetative state . . . the
distinction between ordinary and extraordinary medical treatment becomes blurred...
." Severns, 425 A.2d at 159; see also Foody, 40 Conn. Supp. at 135-37, 482 A.2d at 719-
20; Conroy, 98 N.J. at 369-74, 486 A.2d at 1233-37 (rejection of categorical distinctions
between actively hastening death by terminating treatment and passively allowing some-
one to die of a disease, between ordinary and extraordinary treatment, and between
treatment by artificial feeding and other forms of life-sustaining procedures); PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 82-87 (in the past, this distinction was used
to distinguish obligatory (or ordinary) from optional (or extraordinary) care).
96. Longeway, 133 IIl. 2d at 42, 549 N.E.2d at 296; see also Brophy, 398 Mass. at
439, 497 N.E.2d at 638; Delio v. Westchester County Medical Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 23-
24, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691-92 (2d Dep't 1987).
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or a nasogastric tube, is extremely compelling.9 7
E. The Role of the Judicial Branch
An appropriate inquiry at this point, and one that has
sparked a debate of its own between judges and commentators
alike, is what role courts should play in situations involving the
expression of a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment and to
what extent judicial involvement should be required in such
cases.
The seminal right to die case, In re Quinlan," entrusted to
the patient's guardian, family, attending physicians, and a hos-
pital "ethics committee" the decision of whether to continue ar-
tificial life support in future situations." The court felt there
was no legitimate reason to remove such a complex decision
from the control of the medical profession and held that "a
practice of applying to a court to confirm such decisions would
generally be inappropriate, not only because that would be a
gratuitous encroachment upon the medical profession's field of
competence, but because it would be impossibly
cumbersome."100
One year later, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judi-
cial Court in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,'0' viewed the role of the court quite differently. The
court expressly rejected the Quinlan approach and took "a dim
view of any attempt to shift the ultimate decision-making re-
sponsibility" away from the courts to any other group held out
97. The ethical integrity of the medical profession has been further ensured by the
state courts not requiring any medical facility or its staff to act contrary to their particu-
lar moral or ethical principles when irreversibly ill patients are involved. As a result,
courts have required the patient to be transferred to a different facility, or a new physi-
cian to be appointed to carry out the patient's choice, if the current staff or physician
cannot. See Brophy, 398 Mass. at 439-41, 497 N.E.2d at 638-39. But see Elbaum v. Grace
Plaza of Great Neck, 148 A.D.2d 244, 544 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1989) (nursing care facility
would be required to remove the gastrointestinal tube providing nutrition and hydration
to a 63-year-old patient in an irreversible, persistent vegetative state, in accordance with
her prior statements, if a suitable facility that would accede to her wishes could not be
found within ten days).
98. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nor. Garger v. New Jersey, 429
U.S. 922 (1976).
99. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671.
100. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
101. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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to represent the "morality and conscience of our society.' 10 2
Furthermore, the Saikewicz court, quite definitively, treated ju-
dicial resolution of whether potentially life-prolonging treatment
should be withheld from an incompetent patient as a nondelega-
ble duty of the courts, since such a life and death determination
"require[s] the process of detached but passionate investigation
and decision that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of
government was created."' 1 8
The immediate reaction to the Saikewicz view was anything
but friendly. 04 In fact, the majority of recent cases that speak to
this issue still support the Quinlan approach of judicial
noninvolvement when at all possible. 0 5 In essence, the Quinlan
view advocates judicial involvement in decisions where the re-
moval of life-sustaining treatment is an issue only because of a
dispute between the interested parties.10e
Despite the general disapproval of the Saikewicz view by
commentators and courts, this view has perhaps gained new vi-
tality with the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Estate of Longeway.107 While recognizing that some would con-
sider court intervention objectionable, and that the medical pro-
fession would perhaps resent it, the Longeway court supported
the Saikewicz view for three substantial reasons: 1) the state's
strong public policy of preserving the sanctity of life, which is
102. Id. at 758-59, 370 N.E.2d at 434.
103. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
104. See, e.g., Curran, The Saikewicz Decision, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 499 (1978);
Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 508
(1978). But see Baron, Medical Paternalism and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr.
Relman, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 337 (1978) (judicial intervention is the only mechanism to
guarantee due process to the incompetent patient).
105. See, e.g., Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 223-24, 741 P.2d at 690-91 (although the
court did recognize that a minimal amount of judicial involvement is inescapable where
guardianship is sought and/or an incompetency hearing is necessary); Conservatorship of
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 203, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 850-51 (1988); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921, 925-26 (Fla. 1984) (pursuant to particular
parameters within which a surrogate decisionmaker must operate, prior court approval
for termination of life-support systems is too burdensome since, in general, such a deci-
sion should be made within the patient-doctor-family relationship); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga.
439, 442-45, 321 S.E.2d 716, 720-21 (1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 136, 660 P.2d
738, 750 (1983).
106. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 224, 741 P.2d at 691; see also In re Hamlin, 102 Wash.
2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
107. 133 IM. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
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preserved in refusal of treatment cases through the complex de-
termination of a patient's intent prior to incompetence; 2) court
intervention is necessary to ensure against the remote possibility
of greed tainting the judgment of the surrogate decisionmaker;
and 3) the parens patriae power of the court, which enables it to
protect the estate and person of incompetents.108
As an epilogue to this debate over the degree of judicial in-
volvement necessary to the resolution of refusal of life-sus-
taining treatment cases and as a prologue to the heart of this
analysis (i.e., a discussion of the two tests utilized by the courts
in handling these situations), the apparent conclusion is that the
Quinlan approach to judicial involvement is theoretically and
perhaps, philosophically correct, while practically, the Saikewicz
and Longeway approach necessarily must be followed. Although
the judiciary may wish to remain detached from such personal
decisions as an individual's right to remove life sustaining medi-
cal treatment and leave such a determination primarily to the
individual, family and attending physicians, this wish is imprac-
ticable. As long as ineffective statutory remedies exist, different
evidentiary burdens are required to demonstrate a patient's in-
tent, objective factors are required to be measured, and legal,
moral, and ethical disputes arise between the interested parties
in individual cases, 109 the judicial branch must be the ultimate
108. Id. at 51-53, 549 N.E.2d at 300-01.
109. Even the Quinlan approach, as modified by later decisions, see supra note 105,
recognizes that the judicial branch must get involved when there is a dispute between
the interested parties as to whether or not medical treatment should be withheld to pro-
vide an equitable solution. Practically speaking, this situation almost always occurs since
a dispute usually arises between the surrogate decisionmaker and/or the family, and the
state, via the physicians or the guardian ad litem. The state must always assert its inter-
est in preserving life and is typically reluctant to give up such an interest without a court
mandate.
The guardian ad litem is appointed by the court to represent the interests of the
incapacitated person when the person has no counsel and, typically, when the physicians
or health care facility agree with the guardian's request to withhold medical treatment
from the incompetent patient. The guardian ad litem performs both procedural and sub-
stantive duties and, in general, is required to discover all facts relevant to the medical
treatment of the patient in an attempt to ensure that the guardian's request to remove
life-sustaining treatment from the incompetent patient is, indeed, the best course of ac-
tion for the patient. Such a role on behalf of the incompetent patient necessarily implies
an adversarial relationship with the surrogate decisionmaker and is an additional reason
why, even under the Quinlan approach, courts are needed to resolve such matters. See
generally Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222-23, 741 P.2d at 689-90; Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at
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arbiter. Otherwise, the family of the patient may have no other
recourse to protect the right of the patient to "die with dignity."
F. Summary
All states considering this issue have agreed that an individ-
ual right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment does exist
and is protected pursuant to the common law, the federal or
state constitution or in some instances, all three. Additionally,
the states have agreed that such a right extends to both compe-
tent and incompetent patients but is subject to the four counter-
vailing state interests discussed above. This underlying frame-
work brings us to the heart of the debate permeating right to die
scenarios. Faced with an incompetent patient who is either ter-
minally ill or in a persistent vegetative state, how can a surro-
gate decisionmaker n o preserve the patient's protected right to
133-34, 660 P.2d at 748-49.
110. Whether the selection of a surrogate decisionmaker requires court proceedings
is an issue that has not been expressly faced by many courts. In In re Quinlan, the New
Jersey Supreme Court upheld the appointment of Karen Quinlan's father as her guard-
ian, but did not explicitly rule on whether the surrogate always needed to be court ap-
pointed. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976). In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, in general, a court-designated guardian
should be named as a surrogate for a patient who lacks judicial capacity. 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977). But see John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So.
2d 921, 926 (Fla. 1984) (provided certain prerequisites are satisfied, a judicially ap-
pointed guardian is not required if there are close family members willing to exercise the
patient's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment); In re Browning, 543 So. 2d
258, 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (legal guardian is not essential to make life-sustaining
medical decisions despite the court's advocacy due to the great amount of responsibility
involved), afl'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
As a practical matter, regardless of whether the appointment of a surrogate deci-
sionmaker by the court is mandatory when the family does not seek it, in almost all of
the refusal of medical treatment cases, a close family member has been appointed by the
court at the request of the family member, to be the guardian or conservator and, hence,
the surrogate decisionmaker for the incompetent patient. See, e.g., Conservatorship of
Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 189, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841 (1988) (brother); Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 128, 482 A.2d 713, 715 (1984) (father);
Estate of Longeway, 133 IMI. 2d 33, 36, 549 N.E.2d 292, 293 (1989) (daughter); Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 419, 497 N.E.2d 626, 629 (1986) (wife). But see
Browning, 543 So. 2d at 262 (the court appointed the incompetent patient's second
cousin as the guardian and surrogate decisionmaker because this was her closest living
relative); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219-20, 741 P.2d 674, 686-87 (1987) (the
court appointed the public fiduciary as the incompetent patient's guardian and surrogate
decisionmaker). Court appointment of a guardian or conservator is impliedly necessary
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/7
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refuse life-sustaining medical treatment and what standards, re-
quirements, and limitations, must be followed to preserve both
the autonomy of the patient and the interests of the state?
Because of its personal nature, the state courts have ap-
proached this issue with great reluctance. Nevertheless, given
the lack of express legislative guidance in this area and the pub-
lic need for guidelines in making such life and death determina-
tions, the state courts have not shirked their responsibility to
provide guidance. Accordingly, these courts have developed two
different approaches and three standards to deal with the pro-
tection and expression of an incompetent individual's right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment. These approaches balance the
numerous competing interests involved and attempt to provide
equitable solutions to this complex problem until the legislature
"streamline[s], tailor[s], or overrule[s] the procedures ... to the
extent that no constitutional doctrine is abrogated." '' These
approaches have been labeled the "substituted judgment" ap-
proach and the "best interests" approach.
III. State Court Decisions
A. Substituted Judgment and Best Interests
Both the substituted judgment approach and the best inter-
ests approach for surrogate decisionmaking on behalf of incom-
petent patients are driven by the two traditional values that
guide decisionmaking for competent patients: promoting patient
welfare and respecting patient self-determination." 2
The substituted judgment doctrine requires the court or a
surrogate decisionmaker to "don the mental mantle of the in-
by states that utilize the best interests approach for surrogate decisionmaking. The sup-
port for such an approach is derived from the guardian appointment section of the pro-
bate code of a particular state; that is, to utilize such an approach normally requires the
appointment of a guardian or conservator as a prerequisite. See infra notes 301-50 and
accompanying text. But see In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 818, 689 P.2d 1372, 1377
(1984) (court appointment of a guardian is not necessary if the incompetent patient's
immediate family, after consultation with the medical prognosis committee, agrees that
the patient's best interests would be served by the removal of life-sustaining medical
treatment).
111. Longeway, 133 I1. 2d at 53, 549 N.E.2d at 301.
112. PREsmENr's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 132.
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competent"1 3 and to "substitute itself [or himself] as nearly as
may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same motives
and considerations as would have moved [the patient]."1 The
doctrine had its origin 175 years ago in England when it was
applied to authorize a gift from the estate of an incompetent
person.115 More recently the doctrine has been broadened to
provide guardians with the authorization to consent to certain
medical treatments on behalf of the ward. 1 6 By analogy, the
state courts have used the doctrine to allow guardians to refuse
certain medical treatments on behalf of the ward even if such a
refusal will hasten the patient's death.
Within refusal of treatment scenarios, the doctrine of sub-
stituted judgment calls upon the surrogate decisionmaker to es-
tablish, with as much accuracy as possible, what decision a com-
petent patient would have made with regard to the refusal of
life-sustaining medical treatment.1 7 Employing this approach as
a way to preserve the incompetent patient's right of refusal is
purely subjective in nature, and requires the surrogate to deter-
mine first whether or not the patient, prior to becoming incom-
petent, demonstrated an explicit intent to refuse certain types of
medical treatment in specific situations." 8 Where no express in-
tent is evident, the surrogate, guided by the personal value sys-
tem of the patient, must attempt to identify how the patient
would have approached the decision had he been competent;
thus
even if no prior specific statements were made, in the context of
the individual's entire mental life, including his or her philosophi-
113. In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962).
114. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945).
115. Ex parte Whitbread in re Hinde, a Lunatic, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816); see also
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-52, 370
N.E.2d 417, 431 (1977).
116. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (renal trans-
plant); Guardianship of Moe, 385 Mass. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982) (sterilization);
Guardianship of Roe, 383 Mass. 415, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981) (forcible administration of
antipsychotic drugs).
117. PEsIDENr's COMMBSSION RPORT, supra note 4, at 132.
118. New York, Maine, and Missouri refuse to allow the surrogate to go beyond this
determination in refusal of life-sustaining treatment cases. This rule, which will be elab-
orated on in the next section, has become known as the specific subjective intent rule.
See infra notes 123-70 and accompanying text.
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cal, religious and moral views, life goals, values about the purpose
of life and the way it should be lived, and attitudes toward sick-
ness, medical procedures, suffering and death, that individual's
likely treatment/nontreatment preferences can be discovered.
Family members are most familiar with this entire life context. 19
In circumstances where the patient has never been compe-
tent or has failed to indicate preference while competent, the
surrogate decisionmaker must make a decision for the patient
regarding the removal of life-sustaining treatment according to
the best interests approach. This requires the surrogate to take
into consideration more "objective, societally shared criteria. '12 0
Under this standard, the surrogate decisionmaker determines
what medical treatment would be in the best interests of the in-
competent patient by reviewing criteria such as relief of suffer-
ing, the preservation or restoration of functioning, and the qual-
ity as well as the duration of life.' In addition, the best
interests approach requires the surrogate to consider other ob-
jective facts, such as the incompetent patient's age, level of con-
sciousness, medical condition, isolation, and restrictions on
physical freedom. This analysis promotes an accurate determi-
nation of a patient's best interests with regard to the refusal of
life-sustaining treatment that "will encompass consideration of
the satisfaction of present desires, the opportunities for future
satisfactions, and the possibility of developing or regaining the
capacity for self-determination.'
22
119. Newman, Treatment Refusals for the Critically Ill: Proposed Rules for the
Family, the Physician and the State, 3 N.Y.L. SCH. Hum. RTS. ANN. 47 (1985).
It should be noted that although the scope of this comment focuses primarily on
surrogate decisionmaking with regard to refusal of life-sustaining treatment for incompe-
tent, adult patients, the doctrine of substituted judgment has also been applied to new-
born infants whose brains were irreversibly damaged at birth and were, consequently, in
persistent vegetative states; in each instance, the court concluded that the interests of
the terminally ill infant outweighed the interests of the state and that the parents of the
child, via substituted judgment, could validly assert a privacy interest on behalf of the
infant and authorize the removal of life-sustaining and support treatment. See In re
P.V.W., 424 So. 2d 1015 (La. 1982); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984);
Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1984).
120. PRsIDENT's CoMMIssioN REPORT, supra note 4, at 135.
121. Id. at 135. By "quality of life" the reference is to "the value that the continua-
tion of life has for the patient," and not "the value that others find in the continuation
of the patient's life .... ." Id. at 135, n.43.
122. Id. at 135.
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B. The Substituted Judgment States
1. New York
The New York Court of Appeals first confronted the "right
to die" issue in In re Storar and In re Eichner v. Dillon,123 a
consolidation of two cases. Eichner involved Brother Fox, an
eighty-three-year-old member of the Society of Mary, who was
being maintained by a respirator in a permanent vegetative
state."' The local director of the society, Father Eichner, after
being appointed committee (or guardian) of the patient's person
and property, applied to have the respirator removed. 2 ' His pe-
tition was based on the reasonable likelihood that Brother Fox
would never awake from the vegetative coma and evidence that,
prior to becoming incompetent, the patient had made it known
through discussions relating to Catholic moral principles that he
would not want to be sustained by a respirator in such circum-
stances. 126 Although the court did not expressly recognize the
use of the substituted judgment doctrine in Brother Fox's situa-
tion,'27 it granted Father Eichner's application to remove the
respirator on behalf of the patient because clear and convincing
evidence 28 of the patient's wishes was presented.2 9 The court
indicated that the proof presented was "compelling" because
Brother Fox had
carefully reflected on the subject, expressed his views and con-
123. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981).
124. Id. at 369, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268.
125. Id. at 372, 420 N.E.2d at 68, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
126. Id.
127. "[T]hat issue [whether, in case of incompetency, a decision to discontinue life-
sustaining medical treatment may be made by someone other than the patient] is not
presented in this case because here Brother Fox made the decision for himself before he
became incompetent." Id. at 378, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274; see also infra
note 151.
128. The clear and convincing evidence standard is the highest stardard applicable
to civil cases and is typically required where particularly important personal interests are
at stake. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979). This standard serves to "impress
the factfinder with the importance of the decision," id. at 427, and it "forbids relief
whenever the evidence is loose, equivocal or contradictory." Backer Management Corp.
v. Acme Quilting Co., 46 N.Y.2d 211, 220, 385 N.E.2d 1062, 1066, 413 N.Y.S.2d 135, 139
(1978) (quoting Southard v. Curley, 134 N.Y. 148, 151, 31 N.E. 330, 331 (1892).
129. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 379, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
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cluded not to have his life prolonged by medical means if there
were no hope of recovery .... These were obviously solemn pro-
nouncements and not casual remarks made at some social gather-
ing, nor can it be said that he was too young to realize or feel the
consequences of his statements.13 0
The Storar matter involved a fifty-two-year-old retarded
man who had terminal cancer of the bladder." 1 His closest rela-
tive was his seventy-seven-year-old mother who, after being ad-
vised by physicians that the disease would be fatal, even after
exhausting all medical and surgical alternatives, applied for an
order from the court prohibiting further blood transfusions.1 3 2
Her primary purpose was to maintain her son's comfort.'33
The court, noting the absence of proof similar to that
presented in the Eichner matter, denied the mother's applica-
tion."3 4 The court explained that because the patient had never
been competent to make an express, informed decision about
medical treatment, it would be impossible for anyone to deter-
mine, subject to a clear and convincing standard, whether he
would have wanted potentially life-prolonging treatment were he
competent. 38 In perhaps an ominous statement of things to
come, the court stated that, despite understanding the despair
and religious beliefs of the patient's mother, it could not "allow
an incompetent patient to bleed to death because someone, even
someone as close as a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for
one with an incurable disease." '
In the most recent New York right to die case, In re West-
130. Id. at 379-80, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
131. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 66, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
132. Id. at 373, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 274-75.
135. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275.
136. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76; see also
Delio v. Westchester Medical County Center, 129 A.D.2d 1, 26, 516 N.Y.S.2d 677, 693 (2d
Dep't 1987) (the Appellate Division, utilizing the articulated standard in Eichner/Storar,
and noting the distinctions between the two situations, held that by clear and convincing
evidence, a 33-year-old patient in a chronic vegetative state with no hope of recovery had
"made a solemn, intelligent determination while competent that he would refuse to be
maintained in a chronic vegetative state with nutrition and hydration" and that, there-
fore, discontinuing such medical treatment, pursuant to the application of his wife as
conservator, who was entitled to act in accordance with his prior clearly expressed
wishes, was proper).
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chester County Medical Center,13 1 the Court of Appeals gener-
ated a great deal of controversy138 by clarifying the vague, re-
strictive boundaries alluded to in Storar and further limiting the
right of an individual to exercise the right to refuse life sus-
taining treatment through a surrogate decisionmaker. Mary
O'Connor, the patient, was a seventy-seven-year-old widow who
had become mentally incompetent, as a result of several strokes,
and was unable to ingest food or drink without artificial assis-
tance."3 9 When the hospital and physicians attending Mrs.
O'Connor determined that a nasogastric tube should be inserted
to provide her with greater nourishment, her two daughters ob-
jected. 40 As a result, the hospital sought a court order seeking
authorization to insert the tube."" Her daughters countered that
to do so would be against their mother's request expressed prior
to becoming incompetent that she did not want her life pro-
longed by artificial means if she was unable to care for herself.142
To determine whether there was clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's intent to reject life-sustaining treatment
the facts of this case required the court to analyze more closely
the standard utilized in the StorarlEichner decision." 3 Refining
this standard, the court explained that the heavy burden of clear
and convincing evidence would be satisfied only when "the pa-
tient held a firm and settled commitment to the termination of
life supports '144 prior to becoming incompetent, and the persis-
tence and seriousness of the patient's statements suggested to
the trier of fact that the individual's beliefs were strong and the
commitment to those beliefs was durable and not subject to re-
cent change. 1 5
The court stated that although the best situation would be
one in which the patient had expressed his intent in writing
137. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531 N.E.2d 607, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1988) [hereinafter cited as
O'Connor].
138. See, e.g., Gindes, Judicial Postponement of Death Recognition: The Tragic
Case of Mary O'Connor, 15 Am. J.L.& MED. 301 (1989).
139. O'Connor, 72 N.Y.2d at 522, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
140. Id. at 524, 531 N.E.2d at 609, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
144. Id. at 531, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892.
145. Id.
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prior to becoming incompetent, requiring a written statement in
every case would be unrealistic.14 6 Consequently, oral expres-
sions, similar to the type present in Eichner, could satisfy the
difficult standard articulated. 14 7 However, the court held that
Mrs. O'Connor's oral statements about her desire to decline life-
sustaining treatment, despite being repeated over a number of
years to several people, were not sufficient to meet the clear and
convincing evidence standard of express intent because they
were made in reaction to the "unsettling experience of seeing or
hearing of another's unnecessarily prolonged death"'48 or be-
cause she refused to be a burden on anyone in her old age.'" In
sum, according to the majority, nothing in the record suggested
that Mrs. O'Connor's statements relating to life-sustaining treat-
ment were "transform[ed] . . .from the type of comments that
are often made casually into the type of statements that demon-
strate a seriousness of purpose. 1 50 Therefore, the court was una-
ble to grant her daughters' petition to block the hospital from
administering artificial nutrition and hydration.' 51
146. Id.
147. Id. at 531-32, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
148. Id. at 532, 531 N.E.2d at 614, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
149. Id. ("If such statements were routinely held to be clear and convincing proof of
a general intent to decline all medical treatment once incompetency sets in, few nursing
home patients would ever receive life sustaining medical treatment in the future.").
150. Id.
151. Id. The court expressly rejected the "so-called 'substituted judgment' ap-
proach" utilized by other states relying solely on the personal decision of the patient, if
expressed. Id. at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892. However, the difference
between the two approaches is purely semantic. The approach used simply reflects a
stricter standard under the substituted judgment umbrella. After all, the concurrence in
O'Connor acknowledges that "[w]hat the rule literally demands is an impossibility: a
factual determination of the incompetent patient's actual desire at the time of the deci-
sion .... There is simply no way of excluding the possibility that the patient has had a
change of mind so that her past statements do not indicate her present wishes." Id. at
536, 531 N.E.2d at 616, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96 (Hancock, J., concurring); see also Estate
of Longeway, 133 Ill. .2d 33, 50, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1989). As a result, while the court
stresses its "fundamental commitment to the notion that no person or court should sub-
stitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another,"
O'Connor, at 530, 531 N.E.2d at 613, 534 N.Y.S.2d at 892, in essence, the tougher stan-
dard merely limits a potential surrogate decisionmaker to exercising a patient's right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment if, and only if, clear and convincing evidence of the pa-
tient's express intent are present, pursuant to the guidelines articulated in the O'Connor
decision. See also In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947, 950 (Me. 1987).
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2. Maine
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine considered the right
to die issue in In re Gardner.15 This case involved a twenty-
three-year-old patient in a chronic and persistent vegetative
state resulting from injuries to his head sustained when he fell
from the back of a moving pickup truck.153 The patient had no
hope of ever regaining normal body functions, had lost his abil-
ity to ingest food or drink by normal means, and was being kept
alive solely through the artificial administration of nutrition and
hydration via a nasogastric tube.154 Although no one family
member was ever appointed as the patient's guardian and surro-
gate, all of his family and close friends urged the court to termi-
nate the nutrition and hydration given the patient's express in-
tent, prior to becoming incompetent, "that he not be maintained
on the nasogastric tube .. .
The court, while rejecting the use of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine in this case156 given facts and circumstances simi-
lar to the New York Eichner case,157 held that the patient had
"clearly and convincingly in advance of treatment expressed his
decision not to be maintained by life sustaining procedures in a
persistent vegetative state .... ."1 Therefore, based on state-
ments he had made to both his girlfriend and a close friend, the
court ordered that the nutrition and hydration being adminis-
tered to the patient be terminated in accordance with the wishes
of his family and close friends. "
3. Missouri
In Cruzan v. Harmon,160 the Supreme Court of Missouri
confronted the issues surrounding an individual's right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment for the first time.161 The case involved
152. 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987).
153. Id. at 949.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 950; see also supra note 151.
157. Gardner, 534 A.2d at 952-53.
158. Id. at 953.
159. Id.
160. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
161. For a discussion of the United States Supreme Court affirmance, see infra
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Nancy Cruzan, a thirty-year-old woman who lay in a persistent
vegetative state in a Missouri state hospital, after a car accident
which left her dependent on a surgically implanted gastrostomy
tube for her nutrition and hydration 62 and "oblivious to her en-
vironment except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps
painful stimuli."1 63 In light of what was characterized as a
" 'somewhat serious conversation' [with her roommate] that if
sick or injured [Nancy] would not want to continue her life un-
less she could live 'halfway normally' , her parents requested
that the court authorize the hospital to terminate artificial nu-
trition and hydration for Nancy. 6'
After a comprehensive review of some of the other leading
state cases in this area, 6 as well as a balancing of the relevant
state interests against the interests of the patient,167 the court
found that Nancy's statements prior to becoming incompetent
were informally expressed reactions that did not demonstrate
clear and convincing proof of her intent to refuse life-sustaining
treatment if in a persistent vegetative state. 168 As a result, the
court held that despite the substantial emotional burden on
Nancy's loved ones and given the state's strong interest in pre-
serving life, "the evidence offered at trial as to Nancy's wishes is
inherently unreliable and thus insufficient to support the co-
guardians' claim to exercise substituted judgment on Nancy's
behalf."' '
New York, Maine, and Missouri have been labeled the spe-
cific subjective intent states because a surrogate decisionmaker
can only exercise a decision to refuse life-sustaining treatment
on behalf of an incompetent patient if clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's express intent with regard to such a deci-
sion is manifested prior to becoming incompetent.17 0 As a result,
oral statements of the kind described in O'Connor and Cruzan
notes 351-88 and accompanying text.
162. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 412-16.
167. Id. at 419-22.
168. Id. at 424.
169. Id. at 426.
170. See supra note 151.
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are not enough to satisfy the strict standard of specific subjec-
tive intent required by these states to allow a surrogate to pre-
serve the incompetent patient's right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. The importance of this distinction will be-
come glaringly evident as the cases in the remaining substituted
judgment states are discussed.
4. Connecticut
In Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hospital,17 1 forty-two-
year-old Sandra Foody was in a vegetative state and unable to
breathe without the assistance of artificial devices intended to
regulate her respiration and pulse. 172 Her medical history re-
vealed that for the last twenty-four years she had been suffering
from multiple sclerosis which became progressively worse and
culminated with her developing respiratory arrest and degener-
ating into a permanent and irreversible vegetative state.13 Her
father, as her conservator, petitioned the court to authorize the
discontinuance of the artificial means being used to sustain her
life. 174
After determining the existence of a right on the part of the
incompetent patient to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment,171 the court held that the primary method to express and
preserve that right would be "to determine with as much accu-
racy as possible the wants and needs of the incompetent individ-
ual, not necessarily what may conform to what the majority
deem wise or prudent,' 76 or, in other words, through applica-
tion of the subjective substituted judgment standard. The court
then explained that although Sandra Foody had never explicitly
set forth her views as to whether she would want to be kept alive
in her present circumstances, "[a]n expression of intent while
competent [was] not essential"'177 to applying the doctrine of
substituted judgment because the choice of her surrogate deci-
sionmaker could "be based upon knowledge of the individual
171. 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984).
172. Id. at 128-29, 482 A.2d at 716-17.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 128, 131-32, 482 A.2d at 715, 717.
175. Id. at 132-33, 482 A.2d at 717-18.
176. Id. at 138, 482 A.2d at 720.
177. Id. at 138-39, 482 A.2d at 721.
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gleaned from a family relationship" or other subjective
criteria.' 8
Consequently, the court articulated three conditions which
would serve as prerequisites to future surrogates acting as the
patient's substitute decisionmaker with regard to the continua-
tion of life-sustaining treatment: 1) the incompetent patient's
condition must be permanent and irreversible without any rea-
sonable probability that the patient would ever return to nor-
mal; 2) the patient's attending physician, along with two other
consulting physicians, must concur as to the irreversible condi-
tion of the patient; and 3) there must be a concerned family
member or members who will agree to serve in good faith as the
patient's surrogate decisionmaker.
17 9
Given the satisfaction of these three conditions and the evi-
dence that Sandra Foody, although not doing so expressly, had
resigned herself to her affliction and the inevitable consequences
which did not appear to include life on a respirator, the court
granted her father's petition to remove the devices artificially
sustaining her life. 8 °
5. Delaware
In re Severns51 involved a fifty-five-year-old woman who
was in a coma after suffering severe injuries in an automobile
accident. Almost a year after the accident, her husband peti-
tioned the court to be appointed her guardian for the purpose of
exercising her right not to be subjected to extraordinary medical
means such as a respirator to sustain her breathing and an intra-
venous tube to provide her with nutrition and hydration.182
The evidence indicated that the patient had informed her
husband that in circumstances similar to those in question she
178. Id. at 139, 482 A.2d at 721.
179. Id. at 140, 482 A.2d at 721.
180. Id. The most recent Connecticut right to die case, McConnell v. Beverly Enter-
prises-Connecticut, 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989), will be discussed below in the
context of statutory law. This is the only recorded case to affirmatively utilize a statute,
the Removal of Life Support Systems Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to 575 (Supp.
1990). See infra notes 389-435 and accompanying text.
181. 425 A.2d 156 (Del. Ch. 1980).
182. Id. at 157-58.
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did not wish to be kept alive. 183 Evidence of her intent was ap-
parent from her membership in the Delaware Euthanasia Edu-
cation Council and her desire to execute a living will memorial-
izing her intent to die with dignity, which evidently was never
completed due to the reluctance of her husband to execute one
as well.18' As a result of this subjective evidence demonstrating
Mrs. Severn's intent, the court, applying the substituted judg-
ment doctrine, granted her husband's request to assert her right
to decline life-sustaining treatment.1 85
6. Florida
In John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Bludworth,"'8
the Florida Supreme Court had the opportunity to articulate
guidelines as to when artificial life-sustaining procedures may be
terminated in the case of comatose, terminally ill patients. The
patient in question, Francis Landy, had suffered permanent
brain damage, was terminally ill, and was being kept alive solely
by artificial means.18 7 The patient's wife, after being appointed
guardian, requested that all life-support systems be discontin-
ued and delivered a living will executed by the patient in 1975
explaining his desire not to be kept alive by artificial means such
as a respirator.188
The court, after emphasizing the value of a patient's right
to refuse particular life-sustaining treatments, whether compe-
tent or incompetent," held, pursuant to the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment, that the right of an irreversibly comatose or ter-
minally ill patient may be exercised on the patient's behalf by
close family members, preferably a spouse, adult children, par-
ents, or legal guardians.1 90 As a prerequisite however, the pri-
mary attending physician must certify, with the concurrence of
two other physicians, "that the patient is in a permanent vegeta-
tive state and that there is no reasonable prospect that the pa-
183. Id. at 158.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 161.
186. 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984).
187. Id. at 922.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 924.
190. Id. at 926.
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tient will regain cognitive brain function and that his existence
is being sustained only through the use of extraordinary life sus-
taining measures"191 which include respirators and other artifi-
cial support systems.""
In this case, the prerequisite was met and the court granted
the request of the guardian to terminate the life support systems
since it was what she believed her husband, if competent, would
have requested under the same circumstances.' The court rea-
soned that the living will left by the patient, while not the exclu-
sive means of demonstrating the intent of the patient, was "per-
suasive evidence" of the patient's intent for the purpose of
substituted judgment analysis, and "should be given great
weight" by surrogate decisionmakers who exercise the right to
refuse life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent
patient.'
Guardianship of Browning95 gave the Florida District
Court of Appeal an opportunity to refine and elaborate on the
Bludworth criteria. 196 The patient in this case, Estelle Browning,
had suffered a massive stroke in 1986 which caused permanent
and irreversible brain damage and required her to have a gas-
trostomy to allow food and water to be administered directly
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. In Corbett v. D'Alessandro, the Right to Decline Life-Prolonging Proce-
dures Act, passed by the Florida legislature partially in response to the Bludworth case,
was not applicable since the 75 year-old patient in a persistent vegetative state had not
left any written declaration of her intent prior to becoming incompetent and the "provi-
sion of sustenance" was not a life prolonging procedure for purposes of the statute. 487
So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). The court concluded that the patient's guard-
ian, her husband, could exercise the patient's constitutional right on her behalf to re-
move the nasogastric tube providing nutrition and hydration pursuant to the doctrine of
substituted judgment and the limitations and prerequisites articulated in Bludworth. Id.
at 371-72.
195. 543 So. 2d 258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
196. It also gave the court a further opportunity to demonstrate the ineffectiveness
of the Florida Life-Prolonging Procedures Act in a manner similar to the Corbett case,
supra note 191. The court explained that the statute was inapplicable in this case de-
spite the existence of a living will since "the provision of sustenance" is not a life-pro-
longing procedure for purposes of the statute and the patient in question did not fit the
rigid, statutory definition of "terminal condition" which required the death of the pa-
tient tobe "imminent." Browning, 543 So. 2d at 264-65.
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through the stomach. 97 Two years after the stroke, the patient's
guardian, her second cousin, filed a petition to terminate artifi-
cial life-support including nutrition and hydration and produced
a living will executed by the patient, as well as testimony from
the patient's neighbors supporting the claim that the patient
never wished to be sustained by artificial means. 98
The court first held that the restrictions of the Florida Life-
Prolonging Procedures Act' 99 precluded a statutory remedy to
aid the patient and guardian. 00 It then reasoned that the guard-
ian, as the surrogate decisionmaker, would still be able to pre-
serve the constitutionally protected right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment which is not eliminated or reduced due to the
lack of a statutory right, according to the substituted judgment
doctrine and a reformulation of the Bludworth criteria.2 01
The court stated that when the surrogate decisionmaker
chooses to forego life-sustaining treatment on behalf of the in-
competent patient, adequate and up-to-date evidence must be
available on four issues:
(1) Is the patient suffering from a medical condition which would
permit the patient, if competent, to forego life sustaining medical
treatment?
(2) Is there any reasonable probability that the patient will regain
competency so that this right could be self-exercised by the
patient?
(3) Is the patient's personal decision on this subject sufficiently
clear that the guardian can make a substituted judgment?
(4) Is the patient's right to forego medical treatment outweighed
by state interests . . . 202
The first two questions go to the medical condition and
prognosis of the patient. Similar to the Bludworth requirement,
it must be certified by three physicians via affidavit, deposition,
or sworn statement that the patient is incompetent and in an
irreversible condition with no hope of recovery.2 °0 In conjunction
197. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 261.
198. Id. at 262.
199. See supra note 196.,
200. Id.
201. Browning, 543 So. 2d at 265-66.
202. Id. at 271.
203. Id. at 272.
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with the third question, the court confirmed the adoption of the
substituted judgment doctrine by the Bludworth court in these
cases.2 04 It further elaborated that the guardian makes the deci-
sion regarding life sustaining treatment including the provision
of artificial sustenance, on the patient's behalf not only based on
the express intent of the patient in the form of a living will, if
apparent, but also "based... upon [any] relevant evidence con-
cerning the personal decision which the patient, if competent,
would make 20 5 including oral statements and religious beliefs
and to the extent that such evidence is clear and convincing.
20 6
7. Illinois
In the case of Estate of Longeway, °7 the patient was incom-
petent having sustained serious brain damage as the result of
several massive strokes. Although she was not technically in a
persistent vegetative state, the damage was so extensive that the
physicians concluded that she would never regain conscious-
ness.20 8 The patient's guardian, her daughter, petitioned the
court to order the withdrawal of the artificially administered nu-
trition and hydration sustaining her mother, and alleged that on
several occasions the patient had indicated that she did not wish
to be kept alive artificially.209
The Illinois Supreme Court, subject to particular prerequi-
sites, adopted the doctrine of substituted judgment as control-
ling in situations where a surrogate decisionmaker requests to
exercise the right of an incompetent patient to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment.2 10 First, the incompetent patient must be ter-
204. Id. at 272-73. The court explained:
We emphasize that this doctrine does not allow the guardian to truly substitute
the guardian's judgment for that of the patient. The guardian makes the decision
which the evidence establishes the patient would have made under these circum-
stances. The guardian makes the decision which the patient would have made
even if that decision is different than the decision which the guardian would make
for himself or herself.
Id.
205. Id. at 273.
206. Id. at 272-73.
207. 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
208. Id. at 36, 549 N.E.2d at 293.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
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minally ill within the definition provided in the Illinois Living
Will Act.211 The patient's condition must be incurable and irre-
versible, where death is imminent and the application of death-
delaying procedures serve only to prolong the dying process.212
Second, the incompetent patient must be diagnosed by the at-
tending physician, and at least two other consulting physicians,
as irreversibly comatose or in a persistent vegetative state.213
Third, the patient's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, in-
cluding the artificial administration of nutrition and hydration,
must outweigh the interests of the state, as it normally does.214
Last, the court explained that employing the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment requires the surrogate to first determine if the
patient had expressed explicit intent regarding such a decision
prior to becoming incompetent or, where no clear intent is evi-
dent, to be guided by the patient's personal value system.21 5
Furthermore, the court expressly rejected the theory utilized by
the specific subjective intent states216 by stating that "although
actual, specific express intent would be helpful and compelling,
the same is not necessary for the exercise of substituted judg-
ment by a surrogate. '217
As a result, given the lack of express intent in this case, the
court held that the patient's guardian could substitute her judg-
ment for that of the patient's based upon other, more genera-
lized evidence of the patient's wishes provided that they satis-
fied the clear and convincing proof standard.218 The court
remanded the case back to the lower court in accordance with
the criteria articulated emphasizing that "[o]n remand, the court
should not hesitate to admit any reliable and relevant evidence
if it will aid in judging [the patient's] intent."21 9
211. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 2, para. 702(h) (Supp. 1990).
212. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 47, 549 N.E.2d at 298.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 48, 549 N.E.2d at 299.
215. Id. at 49, 549 N.E.2d at 299; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 123-70 and accompanying text.
217. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 50, 549 N.E.2d at 300.
218. Id. at 50-51, 549 N.E.2d at 300.
219. Id. at 51, 549 N.E.2d at 300 (emphasis added); see also Estate of Greenspan,
137 IMI. 2d 1, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (1990) (after rejecting the application of the Illinois Living
Will Act, ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 110 /2, para. 702(h) (Supp. 1990), because the patient did
not express his intent in writing, the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed the Longeway
[Vol. 11:565
40http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/7
RIGHT TO DIE
8. Massachusetts
In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,2 ° perhaps the second seminal case in the area after
Quinlan, the patient was a sixty-seven-year-old mentally re-
tarded and incompetent man with leukemia. 12 ' He had lived in
state institutions for most of his life and had no family willing to
decide whether to administer chemotherapy to cure the terminal
disease. 2 '
Despite the absence of a family member to act as guardian,
the court "don[ned] the mental mantle of the incompetent, 223
according to the doctrine of substituted judgment, to determine
subjectively, with as much accuracy as possible, the wants,
needs, interests, and preferences of the incompetent patient in
deciding whether to provide chemotherapy. 22 "  The court
explained:
In short, the decision in cases such as this should be that which
would be made by the incompetent person, if that person were
competent, but taking into account the present and future incom-
petency of the individual as one of the factors which would neces-
sarily enter into the decision-making process of the competent
person .... [T]he question is, do the facts on the record support
the proposition that [the patient] himself would have made the
decision under the standard set forth?2 5
Consequently, the court, by identifying the six factors
weighing against the administration of chemotherapy utilized by
the probate judge,2 6 was satisfied that a decision to withhold
criteria for a surrogate to exercise the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, including
the artificial provision of sustenance, on behalf of a 76-year-old incompetent patient in
an irreversible and persistent vegetative state who had orally expressed his desire not to
be sustained by artificial means to his wife, his daughters, his employees, and his rabbi).
220. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
221. Id. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 752, 370 N.E.2d at 431 (quoting In re Carson, 39 Misc. 2d 544, 545, 241
N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (1962).
224. Id. at 750, 370 N.E.2d at 430.
225. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431.
226. Id. at 753-54, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (the six factors include the age of the patient,
the probable side effects of the treatment, the low chance of producing remission, the
certainty that treatment would cause immediate suffering, the patient's inability to coop-
erate with the treatment, and the quality of life possible for the patient even if the treat-
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the chemotherapy treatment from the incompetent patient was
based on a regard for the patient's actual interests and prefer-
ences and that the facts supported such a determination.2 27
Almost ten years later, in Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hospital, Inc.,2 8 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
another opportunity to apply the doctrine of substituted judg-
ment as applied to refusal of treatment scenarios. The patient,
after suffering a brain aneurysm, was in a persistent vegetative
state with a substantially less than one percent chance of ever
recovering cognitive function and was artificially maintained
through a gastrostomy tube which provided nutrition and hydra-
tion.229 The patient's wife, and guardian, petitioned the court to
order the removal of the tube after the physician and hospital
refused to do so.2 80
After reviewing the substituted judgment standard of
Saikewicz, the court "found on the basis of ample evidence
which no one disputes, that [the patient's] . . . judgment would
be to decline the provision of food and water and to terminate
his life." 3 ' The court relied on the findings of the lower court
judge who considered six various factors: the patient's expressed
preferences to several family members, his religious convictions
and their relation to refusal of treatment, the impact on his fam-
ily, the probability of adverse side effects, the prognosis, with
and without further treatment, and his present and future in-
competency. 22 Consequently, after finding that the state's inter-
ests would not override such a judgment, the court granted the
guardian's petition to withhold nutrition and hydration from the
patient since the primary goal of "determin[ing] with as much
accuracy as possible the wants and needs of the individual in-
volved '" 8 had been achieved.
ment brought about remission (but not to the extent that the value of life is equated
with the quality of life)).
227. Id. at 754-55, 370 N.E.2d at 432.
228. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
229. Id. at 421, 497 N.E.2d at 628.
230. Id. at 422, 497 N.E.2d at 628.
231. Id. at 427, 497 N.E.2d at 631.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 433, 497 N.E.2d at 634-35 (quoting Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750, 370
N.E.2d at 430).
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9. New Jersey
The seminal and perhaps most publicized right to die case
is In re Quinlan.2 " In the case, Karen Ann Quinlan, then age
twenty-one, stopped breathing for at least two fifteen-minute
periods for reasons not clearly explained.2 8 Consequently, the
once-healthy girl suffered severe brain damage to the extent that
she was characterized by physicians as being in a persistent veg-
etative state without any possibility of ever regaining cognitive
function or awareness of her surroundings.236 Karen's father, as
her guardian, petitioned the court for judicial authority to order
the disconnection of the respirator, without which the physicians
believed she could not survive.23 7
Given the extreme importance of this decision, the New
Jersey Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine of substi-
tuted judgment and of the legal standards that were to be ap-
plied by the surrogate decisionmaker in making the decision, is
worthy of repetition:
If a putative decision by Karen to permit this non-cognitive, veg-
etative existence to terminate by natural forces is regarded as a
valuable incident of her right of privacy, as we believe it to be,
then it should not be discarded solely on the basis that her condi-
tion prevents her conscious exercise of the choice. The only prac-
tical way to prevent destruction of the right is to permit the
guardian and family of Karen to render their best judgment,
subject to the qualifications hereinafter stated, as to whether she
would exercise it in these circumstances. If their conclusion is in
the affirmative this decision should be accepted by a society the
overwhelming majority of whose members would, we think, in
similar circumstances, exercise such a choice in the same way for
themselves or for those closest to them.
238
As a result, a unanimous court held that Karen's father, as
guardian, could exercise his daughter's right of privacy by au-
thorizing removal of the life-support systems 239 subject to cer-
234. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
235. Id. at 10, 23, 355 A.2d at 647, 654.
236. Id. at 24, 26, 355 A.2d at 654-55.
237. Id. at 29-30, 355 A.2d at 657.
238. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664 (emphasis added).
239. Id.
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tain specified qualifications.40
The case of In re Conroy,24 1 almost ten years after Quinlan,
presented the New Jersey Supreme Court an opportunity to
build on the principles established in Quinlan, when it consid-
ered whether a nasogastric feeding tube could be removed from
an eighty-four-year-old incompetent nursing home resident suf-
fering irreversible mental and ultimately fatal physical ail-
ments. 4 2 The guardian, petitioning the court to remove the
nasogastric tube, was a nephew who had known Claire Conroy
for over fifty years, visited her approximately once a week for
four or five years prior to her being admitted into the nursing
home, and testified that, given her fear and avoidance of physi-
cians in the past, she would not have wanted the nasogastric
tube to be inserted in the first place.248
The court, prior to articulating its holding and rationale,
stressed that the situation involving Mrs. Conroy was different
from that of Quinlan.2 " Mrs. Conroy was not in a persistent
vegetative state but was awake and conscious although burdened
with significantly diminished capacity and a relatively short life
expectancy.245 Given that proviso, the court proceeded to set up
an analytical framework that would, in the future, govern surro-
240. Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Specifically, the court held that:
upon the concurrence of the guardian and family of Karen, should the responsible
attending physicians conclude that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's
ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a cognitive, sapient state
and that the life-support apparatus now being administered to Karen should be
discontinued, they shall consult with the hospital "Ethics Committee" or like
body of the institution in which Karen is then hospitalized. If that consultative
body agrees that there is no reasonable possibility of Karen's ever emerging from
her present comatose condition to a cognitive sapient state, the present life-sup-
port system may be withdrawn and said action shall be without any civil or crimi-
nal liability therefor on the part of any participant, whether guardian, physician,
hospital or others.
Id. at 55, 355 A.2d at 672.
241. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
242. Id. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1216.
243. Id. at 339-40, 486 A.2d at 1218.
244. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54 n.10, 355 A.2d at 671 n.10 (The court left open the
question whether the principles it enunciated might be applicable to incompetent pa-
tients in "other types of terminal medical situations . .. not necessarily involving the
hopeless loss of cognitive or sapient life.").
245. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 359, 486 A.2d at 1228-29; see also id. at 342 n.1, 486 A.2d at
1219 n.1 (analytic framework established by the court is restricted to elderly, nursing
home residents with shortened life expectancies).
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gate decisionmakers attempting to exercise the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment on behalf of incompetent nursing home
residents with limited life expectancies.2 46
First, pursuant to a subjective standard of substituted judg-
ment, the court held that life sustaining treatment may be with-
held "when it is clear [and convincing] that the particular pa-
tient would have refused the treatment under the circumstances
involved. '2 4 7 The court explained that the types of evidence that
are appropriate in determining what course of treatment the pa-
tient would have wished to pursue included written documents
such as a living will or other written directives, reactions that
the patient voiced regarding medical treatment administered to
others, inferences from a person's religious beliefs, or a consis-
tent pattern of conduct with respect to the patient's prior deci-
sions about medical care.2 48 The court further commented that
the probative value of the different types of evidence presented
in a given case would vary depending on the remoteness, consis-
tency, thoughtfulness, and specificity of the prior statements or
actions, as well as medical evidence establishing "that the pa-
tient fits within the Claire Conroy pattern."2
Second, in what is a preview to the theory underlying the
best interests standard,5 0 the court formulated two objective
tests that, if satisfied, would authorize a guardian to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment on behalf of an incompetent nurs-
ing home patient with a limited life expectancy.2 51 The first, the
limited-objective test, allows life-sustaining treatment to be
withheld from a patient "when there is some trustworthy evi-
dence that the patient would have refused the treatment, and
246. Id. at 360-67, 486 A.2d at 1229-33.
247. Id. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
248. Id. at 361-62, 486 A.2d at 1229-30. The court also acknowledged an error it
made in the Quinlan case when it chose to disregard evidence of statements made to
friends by Karen regarding artificial prolongation of the lives of others who were termi-
nally ill since "[s]uch evidence is certainly relevant to shed light on whether the patient
would have consented to the treatment if competent to make the decision." Id. at 362,
486 A.2d at 1230.
249. Id. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 1230-31.
250. See infra notes 301-50 and accompanying text.
251. Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231 ("We hesitate . . .to foreclose the
possibility of humane actions, which may involve termination of life sustaining treat-
ment, for persons who never clearly expressed their desires about life sustaining treat-
ment but who are now suffering a prolonged and painful death.").
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the decision-maker is satisfied that it is clear that the burdens of
the patient's continued life with the treatment outweigh the
benefits of that life for him." ' The first prong of the test would
be satisfied by evidence that, in terms of the subjective test,
would be too vague or casual to constitute clear proof of the pa-
tient's intent, yet might be sufficient to satisfy this test. The sec-
ond prong would be satisfied by medical evidence making it ap-
parent that the treatment in question would not provide the
patient with any net benefit but would merely prolong
suffering.5 3
Under the pure-objective test, trustworthy evidence that the
patient would have declined the life-sustaining treatment can be
completely absent. 54 Yet, such treatment can be refused on be-
half of an incompetent patient if the net burdens of the patient's
life with the treatment clearly outweigh the benefits that the pa-
tient derives from life and the administration of life-sustaining
treatment would produce severe and unavoidable pain to the ex-
tent that continued treatment would be inhumane.2 55 Under this
test, subjective evidence of the patient's wishes with regard to
life-sustaining medical treatment is unnecessary.256 Under both
of the objective tests, it seems that the burdens of treatment are
strictly limited to physical pain and suffering, since the court
expressly refused to consider broader quality of life
considerations.2 7
Because of the particular vulnerability of elderly nursing
home patients, the court also set up a procedural framework, to
be followed by a surrogate decisionmaker wishing to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent nursing home
patient.258
252. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
253. Id. at 365-66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
254. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 365-67, 486 A.2d at 1232-33.
258. Id. at 383-85, 486 A.2d at 1241-42. The Ombudsman has responsibility for in-
stitutionalized New Jersey residents 60 years of age and older. This procedural frame-
work includes 1) judicial determination of incompetency according to a clear and con-
vincing standard and designation of a guardian; 2) notification of the Ombudsman of any
potential refusal of life-sustaining treatment which could be considered a potential case
of abuse; 3) investigation by the Ombudsman including a prognosis of the patient's med-
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The Conroy court's holding was restricted to incompetent
nursing home patients with life expectancies of less than a year.
The companion cases of In re Peter 5' and In re Jobes60 allowed
the New Jersey Supreme Court to fill the gap created by the
failure of the Conroy court to address the status of patients like
Karen Quinlan who were in a persistent vegetative state but had
life expectancies of more than a year.
In Peter, the patient was a sixty-five-year-old nursing home
patient in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery,
yet had a life expectancy of more than one year.2 1 The patient's
guardian, Eberhard Johanning, following the procedural frame-
work outlined in Conroy,262 wrote a letter to the Ombudsman
requesting that he approve the removal of the nasogastric tube
that provided Ms. Peter with nutrition and hydration.2 s Despite
the Ombudsman's belief that the patient would not have wanted
to continue being attached to a nasogastric tube, he refused to
grant her guardian's request because the patient's life expec-
tancy was greater than a year.2 "
On appeal, the court explained that "[bly definition such
patients, like Ms. Peter, do not experience any of the benefits or
burdens that the Conroy balancing tests are intended or able to
appraise. Therefore, we hold that these tests [while applicable
to patients like Conroy] should not be applied to patients in the
persistent vegetative state."2 5 After reiterating the Quinlan
standard, 6 the court held that it also was not applicable in Ms.
Peter's case since, via a durable power of attorney authorizing
her guardian to make all medical decisions on her behalf, she
had left clear and convincing evidence of her desire not to be
ical condition by two independent physicians; and 4) concurrence among the guardian,
attending physician, and Ombudsman that one of the three tests has been satisfied.
259. 108 N.J. 365, 529 A.2d 419 (1987).
260. 108 N.J. 394, 529 A.2d 434 (1987).
261. Peter, 108 N.J. at 370, 529 A.2d at 421-22.
262. See supra note 258.
263. Peter, 108 N.J. at 371, 529 A.2d at 422.
264. Id. at 371-72, 529 A.2d at 422.
265. Id. at 376-77, 529 A.2d at 425 (emphasis added).
266. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664 (according to substituted judgment
doctrine, the guardian and family of the patient are to "render their best judgment" as
to what medical decision regarding life-sustaining treatment the patient would want
them to make).
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sustained in her present condition. Hence, the court decided to
apply the Conroy subjective test to Ms. Peter's situation and
granted her guardian's petition to remove the nasogastric
tube.267
Peter stands for the proposition that the Conroy subjective
test is applicable in every refusal of life sustaining medical treat-
ment case involving a surrogate decisionmaker, regardless of the
patient's medical condition or life expectancy. Thus, life-sus-
taining treatment may be removed by the surrogate on the pa-
tient's behalf when there is clear and convincing proof, in the
form of express intent, that if the patient were competent, treat-
ment would be declined.2
It appeared from reading Peter that New Jersey was aban-
doning the substituted judgment doctrine utilized in Quinlan in
favor of a stricter version of the doctrine and a consequently
higher evidentiary burden, according to the specific subjective
intent rule followed most prominently by New York.2 6 9 A later
case, Jobes, revealed that this was not so.
In Jobes, the patient was a thirty-one-year-old woman who,
while receiving treatment for injuries caused in a car accident,
sustained severe loss of oxygen and blood flow to her brain, re-
sulting in massive and irreversible brain damage and causing her
to exist in a persistent vegetative state.1 0 The patient's husband
and guardian filed suit seeking removal of the life-sustaining
food nutrition system, or jejunostomy tube, from his comatose
wife. Noting that several neurological specialists agreed that the
267. Peter, 108 N.J. at 378-79, 529 A.2d at 426-27. In comparing the Quinlan stan-
dard and the Conroy subjective test it appears that the latter test is more stringent than
the former and bears a similar resemblance to the specific subjective intent approach
discussed earlier. See supra notes 123-70 and accompanying text. Only clear and con-
vincing evidence of the patient's express intent, for example, in the form of a living will
or a durable power of attorney, as in Peter, will be sufficient for a surrogate to refuse life-
sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient. See Moore, "Two Steps For-
ward, One Step Back": An Analysis of New Jersey's Latest "Right-To-Die" Decisions,
19 RurG s L.J. 955, 983-84 (1988).
268. Peter, 108 N.J. at 377-78, 529 A.2d at 425; procedurally, the guardian must still
apply to the Ombudsman and follow the other requirements provided for in Conroy (see
supra note 258), except there is no longer a need to apply to the court for formal desig-
nation of a guardian unless the patient has not already appointed such a decisionmaker.
Id. at 383-84, 529 A.2d at 429.
269. See supra note 267.
270. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 401-03, 529 A.2d at 437-38.
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patient was in a persistent vegetative state, 1 the petition al-
leged that Mrs. Jobes would decline artificial feeding if compe-
tent to decide,2 72 and that it was in her best interests to do so.27s
The New Jersey Supreme Court immediately recognized the
novelty and importance of the question at hand. This case, un-
like Conroy and Peter, required the court "to develop the guide-
lines and procedures under which life-sustaining medical treat-
ment may be withdrawn from a non-elderly nursing home
patient in a persistent vegetative state who, prior to her incom-
petency, failed to express adequately her attitude toward such
treatment. 27 4 After describing the type of evidence that typi-
cally establishes a person's medical preferences under the "sub-
jective test" utilized in Conroy and Peter,278 the court explained
that the statements about life-sustaining medical treatment at-
tributed to the patient were "remote, general, spontaneous and
made in casual circumstances" and "closely track the examples
of evidence that we have explicitly characterized [in the past] as
unreliable. '2 7 As a result, instead of foreclosing the possibility
of any relief due to the lack of clear and convincing proof of the
patient's express attitude toward life-sustaining medical treat-
ment (as New York, Maine, and Missouri courts have done), the
271. Id. at 403-06, 529 A.2d at 438-42.
272. Id. at 409-11, 529 A.2d at 442. In addition to testimony from Mrs. Jobes' clos-
est friends, her cousin, and clergyman intending to prove that, if she were competent,
Mrs. Jobes would not want to be sustained through artificial feeding, her husband testi-
fied that, if competent, his wife would "definitely" choose to terminate the life-sustaining
treatment given certain statements she had made to him in 1976-77 that she would not
want to be kept alive under Karen Quinlan's circumstances. Id.
273. Id. at 400, 529 A.2d at 437.
274. Id. at 399, 529 A.2d at 436.
275. Id. at 411-12, 529 A.2d at 443; see also supra note 267. The standard under this
"subjective test" is strikingly similar to the strict standard required by the specific-sub-
jective intent rule and mandates, according to a clear and convincing degree of evidence,
that the probative value of prior statements offered to demonstrate a patient's desire to
refuse life-sustaining treatment depends on their specificity, remoteness, consistency,
thoughtfulness, and maturity of the person at the time the statements were made. Id.
276. Id. at 412, 529 A.2d at 443; see also Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362-63, 486 A.2d at 1230
(negating probative value of "an off-hand remark about not wanting to live under certain
circumstances made by a person when young and in the peak of health"); Conroy, 98
N.J. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232 ("informally expressed reactions to other people's medical
condition and treatment" are not clear and convincing proof of a patient's intent to re-
fuse life-sustaining treatment).
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Jobes court returned to the Quinlan holding 77 for guidance in
solving this unique problem.17 8
After reviewing the Quinlan holding,2 79 the court confirmed
that it should continue to defer to the substituted judgment of
close and loving family members as surrogate decisionmakers 280
when decisions about life-sustaining medical treatment must be
made for irreversibly vegetative patients, who had not clearly
expressed their medical preferences prior to becoming incompe-
tent.281 Consequently, the court held that, given the trustworthy
evidence of Mrs. Jobes' personal inclinations against life-sus-
taining medical treatment, it was entirely proper to allow her
husband as surrogate decisionmaker to refuse the artificial ad-
ministration of nutrition and hydration on her behalf.28 2 The
procedural guidelines effectuated in Quinlan28 3 were applicable
because they seemed to be "functioning in the setting for which
[they were] intended. ' 284
New Jersey, in coming full circle from Quinlan to Jobes, has
clearly been the most dynamic state in the area of right to die
determinations.8 5 Quinlan and Jobes stand for the proposition
277. See supra note 266.
278. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 413, 529 A.2d at 443..
279. Id. at 413-16, 529 A.2d at 443-46; see also supra notes 234-39 and accompany-
ing text.
280. Id. at 414, 529 A.2d at 444 (the court, as in Quinlan, suggested that such a
decision would be governed by considering the patient's prior reactions and statements
to medical issues as well as the patient's personal value system, with particular reference
to the patient's relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical values).
281. Id. at 417, 529 A.2d at 445-46.
282. Id. at 419, 529 A.2d at 447.
283. Id. at 421, 529 A.2d at 448; see also supra note 239.
284. Jobes, 108 N.J. at 421, 529 A.2d at 448.
285. Just recently, the New Jersey legislature enacted the Declaration of Death Act.
Act of April 8, 1991, ch. 90, 1991 N.J. Laws Sen. No. 1208. This Act authorizes physi-
cians to declare a patient dead if "circulatory and respiratory functions (are] maintained
solely by artificial means, and ... has sustained irreversible cessation of all functions of
the entire brain, including the brain stem . . . ." Id. § 3. However, before doing so, the
physician must use reasonable efforts to determine whether a declaration of death would
contradict the personal religious beliefs of the patient as communicated by family mem-
bers or close associates of the patient. Id. § 5. If the declaration of death would violate
the patient's beliefs, the physician may not declare death solely on the basis of neurolog-
ical criteria. Id. While the statute will obviously be subject to judicial interpretation, it
could circumvent New Jersey case law to some extent because, it appears to reflect legis-
lative adoption of a modified subjective substituted judgment standard. Thus, the stat-
ute appears to defer to close family members or other appropriate surrogate deci-
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that surrogate decisionmakers, according to the substituted
judgment doctrine, can make decisions regarding life-sustaining
medical treatment on behalf of incompetent patients who have
not clearly expressed their medical preferences by taking into
consideration all relevant evidence, specific or remote, shedding
light on the decision the patient would have made if competent.
The Conroy holding articulates a substituted judgment/best
interests, subjective/objective analytical framework applicable to
surrogate decisionmakers seeking to refuse medical treatment on
behalf of incompetent nursing home patients who are elderly
and have life expectancies of one year or less. Peter utilizes the
subjective test of Conroy in a manner very similar to that of the
specific subjective intent states. It provides guidelines for surro-
gate decisionmakers seeking to refuse medical treatment on be-
half of an incompetent patient, regardless of the patient's medi-
cal condition or life expectancy, provided the patient has left
clear and convincing evidence of the desire to refuse such treat-
ment prior to becoming incompetent.
10. Ohio
In Leach v. Akron General Medical Center,5 6 the patient,
Edna Leach, was a seventy-year-old woman suffering from a de-
generative and terminal muscle disease that forced her to be sus-
tained by a respirator, a nasogastric tube, and a catheter.287
Given her incompetent and chronic vegetative state, her hus-
band instituted an action to discontinue all life support systems,
claiming that would be consistent with her desire if she were
competent to express it.258
The patient's husband introduced evidence of numerous
conversations that she had with him and other family members
and friends. The most compelling conversation took place only
two days before Mrs. Leach entered the hospital, when she ex-
pressed her wish to die rather than to be placed on life-support
sionmakers' knowledge of the patient's personal value system regarding decisions about
life-sustaining medical treatment. More importantly, the statutory mechanism does not
require written evidence of the patient's wish to cease life-sustaining treatment. See in-
fra notes 409-35 and accompanying text.
286. 68 Ohio Misc. 1 (1980).
287. Id. at 3.
288. Id. at 3-4.
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systems.2 9 In addition to the evidence of Mrs. Leach's intent
not to be sustained by artificial means, three neurologists testi-
fied that she had suffered irreversible brain damage and that it
was highly unlikely she would ever regain consciousness. 9 0
After succinctly stating the issue involved, 9 ' the Ohio Court
of Common Pleas adopted the doctrine of substituted judgment,
holding that a surrogate decisionmaker could choose to refuse
life-sustaining treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient
when there is clear and convincing evidence of the patient's in-
tent to refuse such treatment under similar circumstances. 2
Consequently, pursuant to the testimony of the neurologists and
the clear and convincing proof of Mrs. Leach's intent to refuse
life sustaining treatment in such circumstances, the court
granted the patient's husband's request to remove the life sup-
port systems. 93
11. Summary: Substituted Judgment States
The basic doctrine of substituted judgment is subjective and
mandates that the surrogate decisionmaker, with as much accu-
racy as possible, make the decision the incompetent patient
would make if competent.2 94 While most of the states seem to be
in agreement concerning the doctrine itself,296 a subtle yet criti-
cal difference is apparent regarding the quality and type of evi-
dence necessary to allow a surrogate to refuse life-sustaining
treatment on behalf of an incompetent patient.
The three specific subjective intent states, New York,
Maine, and Missouri, require that clear and convincing evidence
of the patient's express intent with regard to such treatment be
produced before allowing a withdrawal of the treatment; without
such evidence, an incompetent patient in one of these states is
precluded from having a surrogate exercise her right to refuse
289. Id. at 4.
290. Id. at 4-5.
291. Id. at 6 ("The basic question is how long will society require Mrs. Leach and
others similarly situated to remain on the threshold of certain death suspended and sus-
tained there by artificial life supports.").
292. Id. at 12.
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
295. But see supra note 151.
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treatment.29 In the other states applying the substituted judg-
ment doctrine, a refusal of life sustaining treatment is validated
when clear and convincing evidence of a patient's intent is evi-
dent regardless of whether it is express, founded on the personal
value system of the patient, 9 7 or determined from casual state-
ments made by the patient while competent.2 9
Thus, the New York Court of Appeals in O'Connor and the
Missouri Supreme Court in Cruzan prevented the surrogate
decisionmakers from refusing life sustaining medical treatment
on behalf of their respective patients despite evidence of the pa-
tient's intent 99 that, in other states, would have been sufficient
to allow such a decision even though the evidence was not
express.3 00
C. The Best Interests States
1. Arizona
In Rasmussen v. Fleming,30 1 Mildred Rasmussen suffered
three strokes in addition to a degenerative neural muscular dis-
ease after being admitted to a nursing home at the age of sixty-
four. As a result, she was unable to receive fluids and nourish-
ment without the aid of a nasogastric tube.302
Given the patient's inability to function cognitively, and
physicians' testimony that she was in a chronic vegetative state
from which she would never recover, the public fiduciary com-
menced a proceeding to be appointed guardian. The fiduciary
sought consent to remove the nasogastric tube on the patient's
behalf and asserted the patient's right to refuse medical treat-
ment with regard to "do not resuscitate" ("DNR") and "do not
hospitalize" ("DNH") notations on her medical chart."' 3 Al-
296. See supra notes 123-70 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 171-293 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 148-51 & 164-69 and accompanying text.
300. See, e.g., Estate of Longeway, 133 IMi. 2d 33, 50-51, 549 N.E.2d 292, 300 (1989).
301. 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
302. Id. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
303. Id. at 212-13, 741 P.2d at 679-80.
Although by the time this proceeding reached the Supreme Court of Arizona Mrs.
Rasmussen had died, rendering the proceeding moot, the court in its discretion decided
to address the difficult issues at hand given the underlying and significant public impor-
1991]
53
PACE LAW REVIEW
though the patient's immediate family was notified of the pro-
ceeding, they did not play an active role in the determination of
her treatment.""4
After explaining that the Medical Treatment Decision Act
of 1985305 did not provide Mrs. Rasmussen with a statutory right
to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment,306 the court held that
she was not precluded from a remedy in light of both a constitu-
tional and a common law right to refuse such treatment.3 0 7 The
court first reviewed the statute outlining the general duties and
powers of the guardian.30 8 This statute provides in relevant part,
"[a] guardian may give any consents or approvals that may be
necessary to enable the ward to receive medical or other profes-
sional care, counsel, treatment or service." 09
Despite the arguments of the state the court held that the
statutory right to consent to the delivery of medical care must
include at least implicitly, the right to consent to the delivery of
no medical care.3 10 Furthermore, as supported by the statute,
the court adopted the best interests standard to guide the
guardian, or surrogate decisionmaker, in making a decision with
regard to the refusal of life-sustaining treatment. 1 Under this
standard, the decisionmaker assesses what medical treatment
would be in the best interests of the patient based on several
tance of the case. Id. at 213-14, 741 P.2d at 680-81.
Other state jurisdictions, in similar fashion; have also declined to rely on the moot-
ness doctrine following the death of the patient to avoid resolving the critical issues sur-
rounding an individual's right to refuse medical treatment. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior
Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984); John F. Kennedy Memorial Hosp.
v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921; Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985);
Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
304. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 212, 741 P.2d at 679.
305. ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (1986).
306. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 214-15, 741 P.2d at 681-82 (the patient lacked this
right under the act because she failed to execute the required written declaration and
was not suffering from a terminal condition as required by the statute).
307. Id. at 215, 741 P.2d at 681-82.
308. Id. at 220, 741 P.2d at 687.
309. ARuz. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 14-5312(A)(3) (1975).
310. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 221, 741 P.2d at 688 ("To hold otherwise would ...
reduce the guardian's control over medical treatment to little more than a mechanistic
rubberstamp for the wishes of the medical treatment team."); see infra notes 316, 321 &
334 and accompanying text.
311. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
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objective criteria, which include the "satisfaction of present
desires, the opportunities for future satisfactions and the possi-
bility of developing or regaining the capacity for self-
determination. 3 12
Given the authority of the guardian as well as the appropri-
ate standard to guide the decision, the court held that the pa-
tient's best interests would be served by removing the nasogas-
tric tube and retaining the "DNR" and "DNH" orders on her
medical chart. This decision was based on the patient's inability
to interact with her environment, and the fact that medical
treatment would have provided minimal benefits and would only
have postponed the patient's death rather than improved her
life. 1
2. California
In Conservatorship of Drabick,31' forty-four-year-old Wil-
liam Drabick, suffered a severe head injury in an automobile ac-
cident placing him in a persistent vegetative state. 5 The pa-
tient's brother, after being appointed as conservator, sought a
court order allowing him to remove the nasogastric tube sus-
taining his brother's life, claiming that such a removal was in his
brother's best interests.31 6
After rejecting the doctrine of substituted judgment317 and
the application of California's Natural Death Act, 18 the court
looked to the probate code to determine the powers vested in
the conservator in situations involving the refusal of life-sus-
312. Id. (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 135); see also
supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
313. Id.
314. 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988).
315. Id. at 190, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
316. Id. at 189, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 841. The conservator also offered evidence, based
on numerous and explicit conversations that his brother had had with his paramour, that
he would not want to be kept alive in his present state and that he would want his
physician to remove the nasogastric tubes providing him with food and water despite the
fact that such a removal would cause his death. Id. at 191-92, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 843.
317. Id. at 200, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
318. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1991). The California
Natural Death Act was inapplicable because after his accident the patient was unable to
execute a binding directive to physicians regarding health. Drabick, 200 Cal App. 3d at
214-15, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 858-59.
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taining treatment.3 9 This provides that, "the conservator has
the exclusive authority to give consent for ... medical treatment
to be performed on the conservatee as the conservator in good
"1320faith based on medical advice determines to be necessary...
The court, satisfied with the application of the probate stat-
ute to this situation, explained that, by implication, the statute
gives the conservator the power to withhold or withdraw medical
treatment 21 It held that its only determination was whether or
not such a power was exercised on behalf of the incompetent
patient in "good faith" based upon medical advice or, pursuant
to a best interest standard. 22 The court remarked that allowing
the patient's brother, as conservator in this instance, to exercise
vicariously his brother's right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment according to a best interests standard, protected the
individual and preserved his constitutional rights.32 3
Consequently, the court held that the conservator's good
faith decision in this context, according to a best interests stan-
dard, required the consideration of medical advice regarding the
patient's prognosis and any other information relevant to the
patient's best interests, including any written directives or state-
ments made by the patient. 2  The court cautioned, however,
that the conservator need not prove the patient's desire to with-
draw medical treatment by a clear and convincing standard and
that any statements, formal or informal, of the patient would
only be one factor in demonstrating that the conservator had
considered the patient's best interests objectively and in good
faith. 25
3. Minnesota
In Conservatorship of Torres,32 the patient had suffered
massive and irreversible brain damage due to a lack of oxygen
319. Id. at 200, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849.
320. CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (1981).
321. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 201, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 849; see also supra note 310
and accompanying text and see also infra notes 334 & 347 and accompanying text.
322. Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d at 204, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 852.
323. Id. at 209, 245 Cal. Rptr at 855.
324. Id. at 217-18, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
325. Id. at 212, 217-18, 245 Cal. Rptr. at 857, 861.
326. 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn. 1984).
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caused by cardiopulmonary arrest and had, subsequently, been
placed on a respirator.3 27 A conservator, whose relation to the
patient is unknown, was appointed to represent the patient.3 2 8
Shortly after the appointment, the conservator requested a court
hearing to determine the appropriate medical treatment for the
patient.32 9
The court first looked to the applicable statutory authority
codifying the powers of the conservator in the area of medical
decision making for the conservatee330 The statute provides
that, "the duties and powers.., which the court may grant to a
conservator of the person include, but are not limited to: ...
(4)(a) The power to give any necessary consent to enable the...
conservatee to receive necessary medical or other professional
care, counsel, treatment or service ....
Despite arguments that the language of the statute limited
the power of the conservator,3 2 the court found that the statute
mandated greater authority for the conservator than just the
power to consent to medical care. 3 As a result, the court held
that "if the [patient's] best interests are no longer served by the
maintenance of life supports, the probate court may empower
the conservator [and surrogate decisionmaker] to order their re-
moval despite the absence of a specific provision in [the applica-
ble statute].3 34
After determining that a conservator had the authority to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of an incom-
petent patient, the court rejected three specific arguments con-
trary to the application of this authority in the case of Mr.
Torres.3 35 First, the court held that the decision of the conserva-
327. Id. at 334.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 334-35. The only known living relatives of the patient were a cousin, who
testified at the hearing, and an aunt, who lived in Texas and was unable to attend the
hearing due to her age and health. She did, however, send a letter expressing her belief
that her nephew would not want to be sustained by mechanical devices (this letter was
never considered by the court as evidence). Id. at 336.
330. Id. at 337.
331. Id. (Quoting MINN. STAT. § 525.56(3) (1982)(emphasis in original)).
332. Id. at 337.
333. Id.
334. Id.; see also supra notes 310 & 321 and accompanying text and see infra note
347 and accompanying text.
335. Tortes, 357 N.W.2d at 340-41.
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tor to remove the respirator in this particular case was made ac-
cording to the best interests of the patient in light of the fact
that prolonging the patient's life without hope of recovery, as
corroborated by attending physicians,336 was contrary to soci-
ety's concern for the right of an individual to die with dignity.3 3 7
Second, the court dismissed the challenge to the conservator's
authority on due process grounds, explaining that a full eviden-
tiary hearing was held on the recommended care for Mr. Torres,
full and complete notice was given to all concerned, and all in-
terested parties were represented at the hearing.3M Lastly, the
court summarily rejected the argument that the decision to re-
move the patient's respirator was affirmed by the trial court
based on speculative evidence, because the record did not sup-
port a finding that the trial court had abused its discretion.33 9
4. Washington
In In re Welfare of Colyer,3" the patient was a seventy-
year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state and unable to
breathe without the aid of a respirator.3 4' Her husband re-
quested that she be removed from the life-support systems
maintaining her and allowed to "pass through this life with dig-
nity"3 42 given her condition and grim prognosis for any sort of
meaningful existence.
The Supreme Court of Washington rejected the applicabil-
ity of Washington's Natural Death Act 3 43 since the patient left
no written directive of her wishes regarding life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment.344 The court reviewed the applicable guardianship
336. Id. at 335-36.
337. Id. at 340; see supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
338. Id. at 340.
339. Id. at 341.
340. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
341. Id. at 116, 660 P.2d at 740.
342. Id. at 116-17, 660 P.2d at 740.
343. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122 (Supp. 1991).
344. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 118, 660 P.2d at 741; see also Guardianship of Grant,
109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1986) (the Act only mandates competent
adults to execute directives authorizing the refusal of life sustaining treatment and,
therefore, was inapplicable to the patient since she had been declared incompetent at
14); Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (1984) (the Act
is not the exclusive method for withholding life-sustaining treatment when no valid di-
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statute,3" which provided that a guardian had the power "to
care or maintain the incompetent or disabled person, assert his
or her rights and best interests and provide timely, informed
consent to necessary medical procedures. 34'  Finally, the court
held that since consent to medical treatment was expressly re-
quired by the statute, the refusal of life-sustaining medical
treatment could also be asserted by the guardian pursuant to
the best interests standard. 4 7
In addition to adopting the best interests standard for sur-
rogate decisionmaking, the court established procedural guide-
lines to follow in future cases. These guidelines include: 1) the
unanimous concurrence by a prognosis committee that the pa-
tient's condition is terminal with no reasonable probability of
returning to a cognitive state; 2) court appointment of a guard-
ian and a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the
incompetent; and 3) exercise of the patient's right to refuse life
sustaining treatment if, in the guardian's best judgment, it is in
the patient's best interests to do so.38s
Although the court affirmed the decision of the trial court to
discontinue the life-support systems of the incompetent patient,
it shunned general judicial involvement in every substantive de-
cision to withhold medical treatment.349 The court recognized
that, given the procedural guidelines established, and the possi-
bility of disagreement between family members or physicians,
there would be instances requiring the detached opinion and in-
quiry of the judiciary35 0
rective is executed by the patient prior to becoming incompetent).
345. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 129, 660 P.2d at 746.
346. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.92.040(3) (1987).
347. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 131, 660 P.2d at 747; see also supra notes 310, 321 &
333 and accompanying text.
348. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 137, 660 P.2d at 751 (decision up to the attending phy-
sicians and at least two other physicians).
349. Id. at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750; see also supra notes 98-109 and accompanying
text.
350. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750-51; see also Guardianship of
Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984). The Hamlin court affirmed the best
interests standard of Colyer, but modified the procedural guidelines established by hold-
ing (contrary to the implication in Colyer) that the appointment of a guardian is not
required in all situations. If the incompetent patient's family, after consultation with the
prognosis committee, agrees with the conclusion that the best interests of the patient
would be advanced by withdrawing life sustaining treatment, judicial appointment of a
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IV. The Cruzan Case
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,35
the United States Supreme Court first addressed whether an in-
dividual's right to die was a fundamental right protected by the
United States Constitution - even if the individual was incom-
petent and unable to express it personally. While this case is
important in this respect, the Court restricted itself to reviewing
an extremely narrow question.3 5 This question was whether the
Constitution prohibited the state of Missouri from establishing a
procedural safeguard requiring clear and convincing evidence of
an incompetent patient's express wishes to refuse life-sustaining
treatment before allowing a surrogate decisionmaker to refuse
such treatment on behalf of the patient.3 53
A. Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
After reviewing the facts and procedural history of the
case354 and undertaking a review of the case law and different
approaches utilized by individual states,"'5 the Court came to
several conclusions. Contrary to past state court holdings, 5 it
recognized that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, by direct inference, rather than via the shadowy penum-
bra of the generalized right of privacy,3 5 7 confers a liberty inter-
est in refusing unwanted medical treatment on competent and
incompetent patients even in the instance of life-saving nutri-
guardian is not required. Conversely, if the patient has always been incompetent and
there is no available family, a guardian must be judicially appointed to carry out the
mandate of the best interests standard. Id. According to the guidelines of Colyer as mod-
ified by Hamlin, the court extended its rationale in those cases dealing with the removal
of a respirator to instances where the life sustaining medical treatment in question is the
artificial administration of nutrition and hydration through a nasogastric tube. Id.
351. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
352. Id. at 2851 (quoting Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196, 202 (1897))
(when deciding "a question of such magnitude and importance... it is the [better] part
of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase of the
subject.").
353. Id. at 2851.
354. Id. at 2845-46; see also supra notes 156-61 and accompanying text.
355. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-51.
356. See supra notes 31-47 and accompanying text.
357. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.1.
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tion and hydration.3 5 8
Second, given the valid liberty interest in question, the
Court addressed the issue of whether Missouri could establish
constitutional, procedural safeguards to ensure that a surrogate
conforms as closely as possible to the expressed wishes of the
patient.3 59 Affirming the decision of the Missouri Supreme
Court, 6 ' it held that Missouri, or any state, "may apply a clear
and convincing evidence standard in proceedings where a guard-
ian seeks to discontinue nutrition and hydration of a person di-
agnosed to be in a persistent vegetative state."-61
While acknowledging that substituted judgment states allow
more general proof of an incompetent patient's decision to sat-
isfy the clear and convincing standard necessary for the surro-
gate to act,31 the Court explained that the due process clause
did not require adherence to this approach by all states absent
substantial proof of the patient's views. 63 The Court further ex-
plained that it was not constitutional error for the Missouri Su-
preme Court to impose heightened evidentiary requirements on
the surrogate seeking to terminate treatment in the form of ex-
press patient intent, nor was it incorrect to find that the evi-
dence presented in the case to reflect this intent 6 4 was insuffi-
cient to overcome this standard. 36 5 In sum, although the right to
refuse medical treatment was held to be constitutionally sound,
Missouri, or any state, can, within the bounds of the fourteenth
amendment, safeguard the personal elements associated with
such a right by requiring the surrogate decisionmaker to defer to
the expressed wishes of the incompetent patient before allowing
such a decision to be made.3 66
358. Id. at 2851.
359. Id. at 2852.
360. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc). For a discussion of
the Missouri Supreme Court decision see supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
361. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854; see also supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
362. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854-55.
363. Id. at 2855. The Court also acknowledged that if such a lesser standard were
required by the Constitution, or utilized by Missouri, the "loving and caring" parents of
the patient would have surely qualified to exercise their daughter's right to refuse the
artificial nutrition and hydration sustaining her. Id.
364. See supra text accompanying note 164.
365. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
366. Id. at 2855-56; see also supra notes 122-55 and accompanying text.
Subsequent to the unsuccessful outcome in the Supreme Court, Nancy Cruzan's par-
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B. The Concurring Opinions of Justice O'Connor and Justice
Scalia
While agreeing with the holding of the majority, Justice
O'Connor pointed out that while it was constitutionally permis-
sible for Missouri to formulate a strict method to safeguard an
incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment, such a holding did not preclude other states from
adopting other, less stringent approaches.36 7 Justice O'Connor
further explained that the holding of the majority only decided
"that one State's practice does not violate the Constitution; the
more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the
'laboratory' of the States.3 6 8
Justice Scalia, also concurring with the majority opinion,
made two separate points. First, he explained that "the federal
courts have no business"' 9 in deciding right to die cases because
such decisions are more properly left up to the states through
their elected representatives .37  Given the silence of the Consti-
tution on this issue, Justice Scalia urged individual state legisla-
tures, as state supreme courts have, 71 to decide what measures
should be taken in preserving the life of an incompetent patient
as there is no requirement that the Court "inject itself into every
field of human activity. '5 7 1 Second, citing the legitimate state
interest in preventing suicide, he scrutinized the family's three
attempts at distinguishing the patient's case from ordinary sui-
ents returned to the original trial court on November 1, 1990 with new evidence in an
attempt to surpass the strict standard of Missouri affirmed by the Court. Smolowe,
Bringing an End to Limbo, TimE, December 24, 1990 at 64. After hearing three witnesses
who recounted specific conversations in which Nancy stated that she would not want to
live "like a vegetable," probate judge Charles Teel, Jr. reaffirmed his 1988 decision and
ruled that there was "clear and convincing evidence" that Nancy would not want to
continue living in a persistent vegetative state. Id.; see also Pierce, Many Issues Remain
Unresolved in Wake of Cruzan, INTERNAL MEDiciNE, February 1-14, 1991 at 2 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Pierce]. Since the Missouri Attorney General promised to abide by the rul-
ing, the gastrostomy tube that had kept Nancy alive for seven years was removed on
December 14, 1990 and she died on December 26. Pierce, supra; Smolowe, supra.
367. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858-59.
368. Id. at 2859.
369. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
370. Id.
371. See infra notes 383-85 and accompanying text.
372. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2863 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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cide and concluded that none of the three sufficed.373
C. Justice Brennan's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Brennan had two major disputes with the opinion of
the majority. First, unlike the majority, which classified the
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment simply as a general
liberty interest within the bounds of the due process clause, he
characterized the right as fundamental and deeply rooted ac-
cording to the substantive due process and right of privacy theo-
ries supporting other fundamental, personal rights.3 74 Given his
belief in the fundamental nature of the right to refuse medical
treatment, Justice Brennan explained that any requirement sig-
nificantly interfering with the exercise of such a right cannot be
upheld absent a compelling state interest.3 7 5
As a result, he urged that the Missouri decision be reversed
due to the "improperly biased procedural obstacles imposed by
the Missouri Supreme Court [that] impermissibly burden" the
fundamental right to refuse unwanted artificial nutrition and
hydration.37 6 While acknowledging that no personal right is ab-
solute, no matter how fundamental, Justice Brennan claimed
that the state would gain nothing by overruling the decision of
the patient.37 7 Consequently, although the state had legitimate
interests at stake, Missouri could only "constitutionally impose
those procedural requirements that serve to enhance the accu-
racy of a determination" of the patient's wishes s.37 The Missouri
"safeguard," he pointed out, overstepped this boundary by dis-
counting evidence of the patient's intent and desires, imposing
a heightened evidentiary burden that, in essence, is nothing less
than "an obstacle to the exercise of a fundamental right ...
373. Id. at 2860-62. The three attempts were "(1) that she is permanently incapaci-
tated and in pain; (2) that she would bring on her death not by any affirmative act but
by merely declining treatment that provides nourishment; and (3) that preventing her
from effectuating her presumed wish to die requires violation of her bodily integrity." Id.
at 2860.
374. Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 31-42 and accompa-
nying text.
375. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 2864.
377. Id. at 2869-70.
378. Id. at 2871.
379. Id. at 2874 nn.19-20.
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evinc[ing] a disdain for Nancy Cruzan's own right to choose." '
Although not disputing the fact that the states remain free
to articulate various procedural safeguards to protect the inter-
ests of incompetent patients, Justice Brennan explained that
these protections are not limitless and, within the framework of
the Constitution, must be reliable in discovering the intent of
the patient yet flexible enough to avoid prejudice with regard to
the patient's decision. 38' In conclusion, he asserted that Mis-
souri's strict evidentiary standard failed to pass this test and,
therefore, should be held unconstitutional because, unlike the
vast majority of the states, Missouri "fashioned a rule that les-
sens the likelihood of accurate determinations" 8 2 and displaced
"Nancy's own assessment of the. processes associated with
dying. 3 83
D. Evaluation of Cruzan
It is apparent that the Cruzan holding will have a minimal
effect on the right to die and further appears to be an attempt at
maintaining the status quo. From one perspective the decision is
a critical one since the Supreme Court, for the first time, held
that the right to refuse medical treatment is a right protected
within the general liberty interest of the fourteenth amendment.
Significantly, however, the Court refused to characterize the
right as a fundamental privacy right, which allowed it to easily
affirm Missouri's strict evidentiary requirement as constitution-
ally permissible.
The rationale underlying the Cruzan holding parallels the
reasoning supporting the Court's most recent abortion decision
380. Id. at 2872-73 & 2876.
381. Id. at 2876.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 2878; see also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2878 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Mis-
souri's regulation [requirement of clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent pa-
tient's express intent] is an unreasonable intrusion upon traditionally private matters
encompassed within the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause" since it places the
fate of Nancy Cruzan in the hands of the state legislature instead of those of her family.
Id. at 2882. To avoid such "a distressing misunderstanding of the importance of individ-
ual liberty" he asserts that the state should defer to the decision that gives appropriate
respect to Nancy Cruzan's best interest which, in this case, is to allow her parents to
exercise, on her behalf, her constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treat-
ment. Id. at 2883.
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in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services384 and further re-
flects the general indifference of the Rehnquist Court in protect-
ing an individual's personal rights against burdensome state reg-
ulation. In Webster, while affirming tenuously the fundamental
right to an abortion, the Court held that several regulations re-
stricting this right were valid exercises of state authority and
signaled that even greater state restrictions would be permissi-
ble. Similarly, in Cruzan, while holding that the right to refuse
medical treatment was legitimate and "valid, though not funda-
mental, the Court permitted Missouri to restrict that right and
impose strict evidentiary burdens on surrogate decisionmakers
seeking to exercise the right on behalf of an incompetent
patient.28
In sum, the Court's holding in Cruzan will have little, if
any, impact on the manner in which individual state legislatures
and courts address the right to die issue. Unfortunately, this
translates into a personal medical decision ultimately depending
on the state in which the patient is living. Consequently, unless
state legislatures take the initiative to change the existing land-
scape with effective legislation, the three diverse approaches now
utilized by state courts will continue to be the standards ap-
plied: the specific subjective intent standard according to substi-
tuted judgment theory, as affirmed by the Cruzan majority,"'
the subjective standard pursuant to substittited judgment the-
ory, as advocated by Justice Brennan,887 and the objective, best
interests standard, as suggested by Justice Stevens.3 88
V. Statutory Law and an Individual's Right to Die
As demonstrated, by adopting different approaches based
on either common law or constitutional rights, state courts have
not ignored their responsibility to resolve disputes involving a
surrogate decisionmaker's attempt to exercise the right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment on behalf of an incompetent
patient. However, given the moral, ethical, social, medical, and
384. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
385. See supra notes 354-66 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 123-70 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 171-293 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 301-50 and accompanying text.
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legal considerations involved, courts nonetheless have consist-
ently maintained that refusal of treatment situations "are not
well-suited for resolution in adversarial judicial proceedings"
and should instead be addressed via state legislation. 89
The following passage articulates the rationale underlying
the courts' continued plea for legislative involvement in the sen-
sitive area of right to die:
Legislatures are also considered to be better suited than courts to
set guidelines in this area. Legislatures may be better able to bal-
ance the interests involved in determining whether to permit ter-
mination of care, and they have the power to make laws and regu-
lations for the protection of the public health and welfare. In
addition, the delicate ethical considerations involved in making a
"right to die" decision may require a legislative determination, as
the legislature has the job of weighing and understanding social
interaction. Finally, it is argued that legislatures directly re-
present the people and are thus best able to determine social
policy.3 90
In essence, the state courts, while outlining procedures to
resolve refusal of treatment disputes, have asserted that the
"legislature is free to streamline, tailor or overrule" these judi-
cially created approaches "to the extent that no constitutional
doctrine is abrogated. 3 9 1 In response to the calls of state courts
to provide some legislative guidance in the right to die area,
state legislatures have enacted two types of statutes: durable
power of attorney statutes, which allow persons to designate sur-
rogates to make medical treatment decisions in the event of in-
competency,3 92 and natural death or living will acts, which au-
389. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 225, 741 P.2d 674, 692 (1987).
390. Brown, Therefore, Choose Death, 10 HUM. RTS. J. 39, 44 (1982); accord Satz v.
Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980):
It is the type [of] issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum,
where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested institu-
tions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only can
the subject be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and
individuals be properly accommodated.
Id. at 360; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 343-46, 486 A.2d 1209, 1220-21 (1985);
Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 822, 689 P.2d 1372, 1379 (1984).
391. Estate of Longeway, 133 III. 2d 33, 53, 549 N.E.2d 292, 301 (1989).
392. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.26.335, 13.26.344(1) (Supp. 1989); CAL. CIv. CODE §
2500 (Supp. 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-2205 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1989);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, para. 804-1 to 804-12 (Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-625
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thorize persons to specify the type of care they do or do not
want in written directives left prior to becoming incompetent."' 3
While the practical wisdom underlying the enactment of
such statutes is unquestioned, and while it is perhaps socially
wise to encourage people to furnish written instructions regard-
ing health care in the form of a living will or durable power of
attorney, the simple fact is that these statutes have not aided
the courts because they are seldom used by the general popu-
lace. 9 4 Right to die organizations have received a flood of in-
quiries regarding living wills. 3 95 Even after the highly publicized
Cruzan decision, the numbers still reflect that given the low
probability of becoming irreversibly vegetative, many individu-
als do not feel an urgency to execute formal evidence of their
(Supp. 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-501 (Supp. 1989); NEv. REV. STAT. §
449.800 (Supp. 1989); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-94 (McKinney 1990); OHIO REV.
CODE. ANN. § 1337.12 (Anderson Supp. 1989); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.510 (1989); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 5603(h) (Purdon Supp. 1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 (1989); TEx.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-1 (Vernon Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 3451
(1989).
393. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (1986); ARE. STAT. ANN. §
20-17-202 (Supp. 1989); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1990);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-.15 (1987); IDAHO CODE § 39-
4504 (Supp. 1989); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 'A, para. 702(h) (Supp. 1987); IND. CODE § 16-
8-11-14(g)(2) (1988); IOWA CODE § 144A.7(1)(a) (1989); LA CIV. CODE ANN. art.
40:1299.58.1, 40:1299.58.3(C) (West Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. § 145B.01 (Supp. 1989);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010 (1986); TEXAS HEALTH & SAFErY CODE ANN. § 672.003(d)
(Vernon Supp. 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105 to 75-2-1106 (Supp. 1989); VA. CODE
ANN. § 54.1-2981 (1988); WASH. REv. CODE § 70.122 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 35-22-102
(1988).
394.
Surveys show that the overwhelming majority of Americans have not executed
such written instructions. See Emmanuel & Emmanuel, The Medical Directive: A
New Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 J. A.M.A. 3288 (1989) (only
9% of Americans execute advance directives about how they would wish treat-
ment decisions to be handled if they became incompetent); American Medical
Association Surveys of Physician and Public Opinion on Health Care Issues 29-
30 (1988) (only 15% of those surveyed had executed living wills...).
Cruzan v. Director of Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2875 n.21 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting); see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES, INSTITUTIONAL PROTOCOLS FOR DECISIONS ABOUT LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS 23
n.2 (1988) (1986 Oregon study found that although adults in 82% of homes had heard
about living wills, only 23% of adults in homes with persons over 65 and 16% of other
adults had prepared one).
395. See Friedrich, A Limited Right to Die, TIME, July 9, 1990, at 59; Pierce, supra
note 366, at 17.
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health care preferences.3 96
As one California appellate court observed, "[tihe lack of
generalized public awareness of the statutory scheme and the
typically human characteristics of procrastination and reluc-
tance to contemplate the need for such arrangements however
makes this a tool which will all too often go unused by those who
might desire it."'97
Several state courts have confirmed this rationale given
their rejection and nonapplication of natural death acts the ab-
sence of a written directive or failure of the statute to cover a
patient's specific situation; 398 a review of two particular exam-
ples will emphasize the point. In Corbett v. D'Alessandro,s99 the
court explained that the statutory right created by the Florida
Right to Decline Life-Prolonging Procedures Act 0 0 could not be
applied to a guardian's request to withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration from a seventy-five-year-old woman in a persis-
tent vegetative state.40 1 The court reasoned that the patient had
not left any written declaration of her intent prior to becoming
incompetent and the "provision of sustenance" was not a life-
prolonging procedure for the purposes of the statute. 02 Simi-
larly, in Rasmussen v. Fleming,05 the Arizona Supreme Court
explained that the Arizona Medical Treatment Decision Act404
did not provide the patient with a statutory right to refuse life-
396. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
397. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 194 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489
(1983); see also In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 551, 531
N.E.2d 607, 626, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 905 (1988) (Simons, J., dissenting) (When a person
relates to family or friends that she does not want her life to be sustained artificially, she
is "express[ing] her wishes in the only terms familiar to her, and ... as clearly as a lay
person should be asked to express them. To require more is unrealistic, and for all prac-
tical purposes, it precludes the rights of patients to forego life-sustaining treatment.").
398. See supra notes 194, 196, 219, 306, 318 & 344 and accompanying text.
399. 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
400. FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-.15 (1987).
401. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 370.
402. Id; see supra note 194; see also Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 264-
65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (The Act was inapplicable to the patient's situation despite
the existence of a living will since "the provision of sustenance" is not a life-prolonging
procedure for purposes of the statute and the patient in question did not fit the rigid,
statutory definition of "terminal condition," which required the death of the patient to
be "imminent."), aff'd, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
403. 154 Ariz. 2d 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
404. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to 36-3210 (1986).
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sustaining medical treatment because she failed to execute the
required written declaration and was not suffering from a "ter-
minal condition" as defined by the statute. 0 5
Despite the rejection of these living will statutes, state
courts have not held that these statutes are the exclusive remedy
for patients and, therefore, preclude the exercise of any constitu-
tional or common law rights of patients simply because the stat-
ute is not applicable to them.406 Fortunately for the patients and
surrogate decisionmakers, such a judicial stance translates into
courts analyzing the request to refuse life-sustaining treatment
according to one of the three standards discussed above since
the absence of a statutory remedy "does not affect the otherwise
existing constitutional [or common law] rights of persons in a
permanent vegetative state with no reasonable prospect of
regaining cognitive brain function to forego the use of artificial
life sustaining measures."' 07
It is apparent that statutes requiring written evidence of pa-
tient intent, either by living will or health care durable power of
attorney, are theoretically sound and perhaps indicative of legis-
lative intent or public policy. However, these statutes do not
provide practical solutions to refusal of treatment scenarios,
given general ignorance of the existence of such remedies, pro-
crastination on the part of the average person, and narrow appli-
cation to actual patient situations. 408 North Carolina, Oregon,
405. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
406. See, e.g., Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Evidence that
the Florida Act was not intended to encompass the entire spectrum of instances in which
a patient's privacy rights could be exercised was found in § 765.15 of the statute itself
(that is, the statute is "cumulative to the existing law ... and do[es] not impair any
existing rights ... a patient... may have... under the common law or statutes of the
state."). Id.; see also In re Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 816, 689 P.2d 1372, 1376 (1984); Guardian-
ship of Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553, 747 P.2d 445, 449 (1986).
407. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 370-71.
408. Starting in December, 1991, the Patient Self-Determination Act will require
health care facilities receiving federal funds to maintain written policies about patient
decision making and to advise patients of their rights to make health care decisions using
advance directives such as living wills and durable powers of attorney for health care. 42
U.S.C. § 1395cc(a)(1) (1990). More specifically, such facilities must note in patient
records whether the patient has made an advance directive, ensure compliance with ad-
vance directives in accordance with state law, and provide staff and community educa-
tion about advance directives. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1990); Pierce, supra note 366, at 17.
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Virginia, and Connecticut, have had the foresight to recognize
this and have enacted natural death legislation that specifically
provides for withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for patients
who have not executed a written, natural death directive and are
diagnosed as comatose with no reasonable possibility of re-
turning to a cognitive sapient state.40 9
The Connecticut Removal of Life Support Systems Act 410 is
perhaps the most important of these statutes because it is the
only statute of the four thus far to be used affirmatively by a
state court confronted with a refusal of life-sustaining treatment
situation."1" In McConnell v. Beverly Enterprises-Connecti-
cut,41 2 the Supreme Court of Connecticut was confronted with a
husband and children seeking an injunction to remove a gastros-
tomy tube through which the patient received life-sustaining nu-
trition and hydration. 13 The patient, the fifty-seven-year-old
wife of the plaintiff and mother of the three coplaintiffs, was in a
persistent vegetative state with no prospect of improvement.414
The record of the trial court revealed that the patient, because
of her professional experience and training as a nurse, had ex-
pressly and repeatedly informed her family and coworkers that
if she were ever incapacitated, she would not want to be kept
alive by artificial means.'1 6
Prior to McConnell, the only other Connecticut case to
squarely address the right to die issue was Foody v. Manchester
Memorial Hospital,415 in which the court held that the primary
method for a surrogate decisionmaker to express an incompetent
409. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (Supp. 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322
(Cum. Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 127.640 (1989); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986 (1986);
see also New Jersey Declaration of Death Act of April 8, 1991, ch. 90, 1991 N.J. Laws
Sen. No. 1208 (after using reasonable efforts to determine the personal religious beliefs
of the patient, as communicated by the family or other close associates, a physician may
declare the patient dead according to neurological criteria if such a declaration will not
violate those beliefs; this appears to be legislative adoption of a modified subjective sub-
stituted judgment standard not requiring written directions by the patient); see supra
note 285.
410. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to 19a-575 (Supp. 1990).
411. See supra note 180.
412. 209 Conn. 692, 553 A.2d 596 (1989).
413. Id. at 695, 553 A.2d at 598.
414. Id. at 696, 553 A.2d at 598.
415. Id. at 696, 553 A.2d at 598-99.
416. 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 482 A.2d 713 (1984).
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patient's constitutional and common law right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment was through application of the subjective sub-
stituted judgment standard. 17 In McConnell, the court im-
pliedly recognized that the statutory mechanism provided by the
legislature, given their knowledge of both a constitutional right
of privacy and a common law right of self-determination, would
streamline or perhaps overrule the judicially created substituted
judgment standard of Foody. 18
The Connecticut Supreme Court, in light of the fact that
many state courts confronted with upholding a terminally ill pa-
tient's right to refuse treatment
have urged legislatures to enact guidelines for appropriate private
decisionmaking in these heart-rending dilemmas: . . . [The court
explained] [w]hen the [Connecticut state] legislature has at-
tempted to respond to this urgent request for statutory assis-
tance, we have an obligation to pursue the applicability of statu-
tory criteria before resorting to an exploration of residual
common law [or constitutional] rights, if any such rights indeed
remain. We must therefore decide whether a reasonable construc-
tion of our act ever permits the removal of a gastrostomy tube
[providing artificial nutrition and hydration].' 19
Other state courts making the same inquiries with regard to
similar statutory mechanisms, have been forced to resort to com-
mon law or constitutional remedies for the guardian and patient
according to one of the three available standards due to the in-
applicability of the statute.'2 0 However, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court was able to utilize it as a remedy for Mrs. McCon-
nell because of the construction and flexibility of the
Connecticut Act. The court found that the legislature ap-
proached the issue by establishing three guiding principles. "'21
First, if a patient is not in a terminal condition, as defined by
417. See supra notes 171-80 and accompanying text.
418. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 698-99, 553 A.2d at 600; see also id. at 697 n.2, 553
A.2d at 599 n.2 ("Although the trial court decided that judgment for the plaintiffs was,
in the alternative [to a statutory remedy], also warranted on a theory of substituted
judgment, it is not necessary for us to review that holding in the circumstances of the
present case.").
419. Id. at 703, 553 A.2d at 602; see also supra notes 388-90 and accompanying text.
420. See supra notes 398-407 and accompanying text.
421. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 703, 553 A.2d at 602.
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the statute,422 "beneficial medical treatment and nutrition and
hydration must be provided." 23 Second, if a patient is in a ter-
minal condition, life-sustaining treatment may be removed in
the exercise of the physician's best medical judgment given the
informed consent of the guardian and the expressed wishes of
the patient.424 Finally, any removal of life-sustaining treatment
must be done in a manner consistent with providing "comfort,
care and pain alleviation" for the patient. 25
The court noted, however, that these three guidelines were
unclear as to the issue of removal of a gastrostomy tube, espe-
cially given the exclusion of the provision of nutrition and hy-
dration from the definition of "life-support system" in § 19a-
570(1) of the Act.426 Despite the possibility that the statute
would not be applicable given this exclusion, the court stretched
the construction of the statute and held that, in giving effect to
every section of the Act, it "implicitly contemplates the possible
removal from a terminally ill patient of artificial technology in
the form of a device such as a gastrostomy tube, but it does not,
under any circumstances, permit the withholding of normal nu-
tritional aids such as a spoon or straw.41 2 7 In other words, to
implement the Act's "beneficent purpose of providing functional
guidelines for the exercise of common law and constitutional
rights, '428 the court found a distinction between artificial and
normal administration of nutrition and hydration which permit-
ted the withdrawal of a gastrostomy tube.'29
422. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-570(3) (Supp. 1990) ("[t]he final stage of an incurable
or irreversible medical condition which, in the opinion of the attending physician, will
result in death").
423. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 703, 553 A.2d at 602; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571
(Supp. 1990).
424. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 703, 553 A.2d at 602; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-571
(Supp. 1990).
425. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 703, 553 A.2d at 602; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-573
(Supp. 1990).
426. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 704, 553 A.2d at 602.
427. Id. at 705, 553 A.2d at 603; but see id. at 711, 553 A.2d at 606 (Healey, J.,
concurring) (The so-called "middle construction" of the statutory scheme, while consis-
tent with the plaintiffs' claims for relief, "involves a flawed process of statutory
construction.").
428. Id. at 705, 553 A.2d at 603.
429. Id.; see also id. at 705, n.12, 553 A.2d at 603, n.12 ("We note that the statute
could have been drafted to require expressly that hydration and nutrition be made avail-
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The court then applied the facts of Mrs. McConnell's situa-
tion to its interpretation and construction of the Act. First, the
court held that, pursuant to § 19a-570(3), the patient was in a
"terminal condition" as deemed by her attending physician. 30
Second, the court noted that the patient's family brought the
action in question and, therefore, held that their consent to re-
moval of the tube from the patient, as required by § 19a-571(3),
was satisfied.43 Last, the court affirmed the trial court's finding
that the attending physician, in making his decision to remove
the feeding tube, used his best medical judgment and considered
the expressed wishes of the patient through her guardian and
family as required by §§ 19a-571(1), 19a-571(4). 5 2 The court ex-
plained that the evidence presented was clear and convincing of
the patient's desire not to have her life prolonged if an injury
ever left her in a vegetative state.43 As a result, while perhaps
stretching the plain meaning of the statute,'3 ' the court granted
the family's petition to remove the gastrostomy tube from Mrs.
McDonnell based solely on the statutory right created by the
Removal of Life Support Systems Act (which simply appears to
be a codified modification of substituted judgment), and notably
did so without a written directive from the patient memorial-
izing her wishes.435
VI. Conclusion
The exercise of an individual's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment by a surrogate decisionmaker will continue to be a
controversial area of constitutional and health law for two major
reasons: the absence of effective legislation in the area and the
able even through artificial devices." The court then makes reference to the Missouri
living will act reviewed in Cruzan, Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986), that was inappli-
cable not only because no written directive was left by the patient but because the stat-
ute specifically provided that "any procedure to provide nutrition and hydration" was
not included in the definition of "death-prolonging procedure." (emphasis added)).
430. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 707-08, 553 A.2d at 604 (The court also noted that the
conclusion of the attending physician in this regard, after consultation with the family,
should be "unimpeded by courts, other medical experts or ethicists.").
431. Id. at 708, 553 A.2d at 604.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 708-09, 553 A.2d at 604-05.
434. See supra note 427 and accompanying text.
435. McConnell, 209 Conn. at 710, 553 A.2d at 605.
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diverse approaches utilized by the state courts in confronting
the issue that, in some instances, preclude a guardian from exer-
cising the right. In light of the minimal impact of Cruzan on
existing state court decisions, it appears that only state legisla-
tures or state courts can take the initiative to perhaps lessen the
existing controversy by taking approaches that truly reflect a
balancing of a patient's autonomy and the legitimate state inter-
ests involved.
The state legislature, as the voice of the people, with a gen-
eral mandate of weighing and understanding social interaction
for the protection of the public health and welfare, must be the
body that directly confronts the many legal, medical, and ethical
issues associated with an individual's right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment. State courts have consistently called for such
legislative action 'in recognizing that the determination of such
sensitive issues belongs not in the adversarial setting of a court,
but in the fact-finding and viewpoint-synthesizing atmosphere of
the legislative forum.
The enactment of living will and durable power of attorney
statutes, which enable people to memorialize their desires with
regard to health care and life-sustaining treatment, is wise from
a public policy perspective. However, such statutes should only
be considered a first step in protecting an individual's auton-
omy. The absence of a statutory right which does not require
written instructions, in states such as New York and Missouri,
precludes guardians from expressing the rights of an incompe-
tent patient and at the very least demonstrates a failure on the
part of the state legislatures to protect adequately the rights of
the vast majority of people who are simply unaware of the exis-
tence or the need to execute documents outlining their wishes
regarding life-sustaining treatment.
It is clear that the state legislatures of North Carolina, Ore-
gon, Virginia, and Connecticut, had the foresight to recognize
the need for such legislation by creating statutory rights for in-
competent patients who fail to leave any written instructions of
their intent to refuse medical treatment.3 6 The Connecticut
statute, the Removal of Life Support Systems Act, 3 7 is perhaps
436. See supra note 409.
437. See supra note 410.
[Vol. 11:565
74http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/7
RIGHT TO DIE
the most important of the four given its affirmative application
in the McConnell case.488 Therefore, it should serve as a model
for other state legislatures to enact similar statutes. The Con-
necticut Act, which presumably symbolizes the social policy of
the people of the state as expressed through their representa-
tives, balances the many competing interests involved and codi-
fies under what circumstances and according to what guidelines
life-sustaining treatment can be withdrawn from an incompetent
patient who left no written instructions.
In that sense, statutes of this sort accomplish several objec-
tives that many state legislatures should take note of if con-
cerned with lessening the controversy surrounding the right to
die. First, they allow state courts to abandon judicially created
remedies and standards in favor of legislative remedies. Second,
the statutory rights created represent the voice of the people
who, given the personal nature of the issue, are the patients and
families most effected by the outcome of the dilemmas involved.
Last, and perhaps most important, based on the flexible applica-
tion of the Connecticut statute in McConnell, they accurately
demonstrate respect for both the autonomy of the individual,
and the legitimate state interest in preserving life.
In light of the probability that the legislative landscape will
remain the same and state legislatures will not enact Connecti-
cut-type statutes, the responsibility to develop a flexible ap-
proach to the right to die issue will continue to rest with the
state courts. In the absence of effective legislation in the area,
state courts have developed two standards and three judicially
created approaches in attempting to resolve the problems
presented by a surrogate decisionmaker wishing to express the
right of an incompetent patient to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment: substituted judgment (including the specific subjective in-
tent rule and the subjective standard) and best interests.
These approaches, with the possible exception of the spe-
cific subjective intent rule, have allowed patients to express
through their surrogate decisionmaker their right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment. It is apparent that, in the abstract, these
different approaches should not be viewed strictly as mutually
exclusive alternatives, but rather as part of a straight-line con-
438. See supra notes 410-35 and accompanying text.
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tinuum which would leave open the possibility of applying any
of the approaches depending on the patient's situation. Such a
theory is not unique given the implication of the language in
several cases,43 9 the view of the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research,4 40 and at least one recent commentary on the
subject.44 1
In essence, application of such a theory would allow state
courts, as evidence of an incompetent patient's subjective intent
becomes less and less reliable (or in some instances non-exis-
tent), to transform their analysis from the subjective, via substi-
tuted judgment, to the objective, according to the best interests
approach. The theory would not preclude any incompetent pa-
tients from expressing their rights with regard to medical treat-
ment through their guardians simply because no evidence of
their intent is evident.4 12 Furthermore, and perhaps most impor-
439. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (1987);
Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 40 Conn. Supp. 127, 139-40, 482 A.2d 713, 720-21
(1984); Estate of Longeway, 133 IlM. 2d 33, 49, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (1989) ("While not
passing on the viability of the best interests theory in Illinois, we decline to adopt it in
this case because we believe the record demonstrates the relevancy of the substituted
judgment theory."); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 364, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1985):
[1In the absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend
that the right to self-determination serves as a basis for substituted decision-mak-
ing. . . . We hesitate, however, to foreclose the possibility of humane actions,
which may involve termination of life-sustaining treatment, for persons who never
clearly expressed their desires about life-sustaining treatment but who are now
suffering a prolonged and painful death.
Id.
440. PRESMENr's COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. The decisions of surro-
gates should, when possible, attempt to replicate the ones that the patient would make if
capable of doing so. When lack of evidence about the patient's wishes precludes this,
decisions by surrogates should seek to protect the patient's best interests. Id. at 136.
"The substituted judgment standard can be used only if a patient was once capable of
developing views relevant to the matter at hand; further, there must be reliable evidence
of those views." Id. The Commission recommends using the best interests approach
when the patient's likely decision, needed to apply the substituted judgment approach, is
unknown. Id. at 136.
441. Pollock, Life and Death Decisions: Who Makes Them and By What Stan-
dards, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 505, 518-21 (1989).
442. For a detailed discussion of the specific subjective intent rule as applied by the
courts of New York, Maine, and Missouri, and affirmed in Cruzan, see supra notes 123-
70 and accompanying text & notes 354-66 and accompanying text. This author agrees
with Justice Brennan's dissent in Cruzan, see supra notes 374-83 and accompanying
text, and feels that further application of such a restrictive approach is diametrically
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tantly, application of such a theory mandating the viability of
both substituted judgment and best interests in any refusal of
treatment case accomplishes the two major objectives of courts
when confronted with cases in this area. First, given the array of
options available to a court and the surrogate decisionmaker, the
theory's flexibility adequately protects an individual's autonomy
and right of self-determination with regard to medical treat-
ment. Second, given the requirements and standards that still
need to be satisfied even under the most objective best interests
analysis, the theory would still leave the courts enough space to
preserve the state's legitimate interest in preserving life by en-
suring that an incompetent patient's right to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment will not be expressed for ill motives or
pecuniary gain.
In conclusion, absent effective legislation or a flexible judi-
cial approach, the cases that reach the courts involving an in-
competent individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
will continue to generate inconsistent holdings depending on the
state in question. Therefore, they will continue to cause contro-
versy and confusion in what is an extremely personal and sensi-
tive issue. Two ways to resolve the right to die controversy in-
clude the enactment of effective legislative action and creative
judicial approaches that will demonstrate balance and respect
for both the individual and the state. Such legislative action
should include the enactment of statutes outlining standards
and limitations for expression of an incompetent patient's right
to die by a surrogate without requiring written evidence of a pa-
tient's intent. Additionally, such judicial creativity should in-
clude the application of a theory to refusal of treatment cases
that leaves open the possibility of using whichever of the two
established approaches is appropriate under the circumstances.
Jeffrey J. Delaneyt
opposed to this continuum theory given its sole effect of precluding, and therefore bur-
dening, the expression of a patient's rights solely due to a lack of specific intent.
t The author greatly appreciates the constant encouragement and support of Gary,
Marie and Kevin Delaney. In addition, he wishes to thank his fianc6e, Anna Maria
D'Elia, for always being there.
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